Making organizational punishment work: The effects of social accounts and punishment severity by Noon, Andrew L.
University of Nebraska at Omaha
DigitalCommons@UNO
Student Work
8-2001
Making organizational punishment work: The
effects of social accounts and punishment severity
Andrew L. Noon
University of Nebraska at Omaha
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork
Part of the Psychology Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by
DigitalCommons@UNO. It has been accepted for inclusion in Student
Work by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UNO. For
more information, please contact unodigitalcommons@unomaha.edu.
Recommended Citation
Noon, Andrew L., "Making organizational punishment work: The effects of social accounts and punishment severity" (2001). Student
Work. 80.
https://digitalcommons.unomaha.edu/studentwork/80
MAKING ORGANIZATIONAL PUNISHMENT WORK: THE EFFECTS
OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTS AND FUNISIIMENT SEVERITY
A Thesis 
Presented to the 
Department of Psychology 
and the
Faculty of the Graduate College 
University of Nebraska
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements of the Degree 
Master of Arts 
University of Nebraska at Omaha
By
Andrew L. Noon 
August, 7.001
UMI Number: EP72733
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
Dissertation Publishing
UMI EP72733
Published by ProQuest LLC (2015). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
THESIS ACCEPTANCE
Acceptance for the faculty of the Graduate College, University of Nebraska, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts, University of Nebraska at Omaha.
Committee
/r
Chairperson -■ ■— «-«—
Date 7 / / 2 , / o z _______________
MAKING ORGANIZATIONAL PUNISHMENT WORK: THE EFFECTS
OF SOCIAL ACCOUNTS AND PUNISHMENT SEVERITY
Andrew L. Noon, M.A.
University of Nebraska, 2001 
Advisor: Wayne Harrison, Ph.D.
Punishment continues to be used by organizations as one method to eliminate unwanted 
employee behaviors. Bennett (1998) argued that managers must be aware of two aspects 
of the punishment situation: (a) the punishment intensity and (b) the negative 
consequences of the punishment. Previous research indicates that strong punishments are 
most effective at changing unwanted behaviors, but strong punishments are also more 
prone to producing negative attitudes in the punished individual. One way managers may 
be able to reduce the negative impact of punishment is by using explanations regarding 
the need for punishment. These explanations are called social accounts. Not all social 
accounts have the same effectiveness; therefore, both ideological and causal accounts 
were examined in this research to evaluate their effectiveness in mitigating the negative 
impact of punishment. Using a 3x3 between-subjects design, the effect of punishment 
severity (low, moderate and high) and social account type (ideological, causal, and 
redundant) on performance, fairness of punishment, Interactional Justice, satisfaction 
with the experiment, anger, and intentions to retaliate was assessed. One hundred eighty 
undergraduate students from a Midwest university participated in the study. Participants 
were given an opportunity to win lottery tickets for a $150 gift certificate based on their 
performance on two simple tasks. Participants were told that lottery tickets would be
removed (low, moderate, or high punishment) if they did not perform satisfactorily on 
Task 1. After the punishment, participants were given one of three social accounts and a 
set of questionnaires examining their attitudes. Task 2 was completed to determine the 
behavior change from Task 1 to Task 2. A significant main effect of punishment severity 
was found for punishment fairness, satisfaction with the experiment, anger, and intentions 
to retaliate. A significant main effect of account type was found for Interactional Justice 
and satisfaction with the experiment. Finally, a significant interaction of punishment 
severity and account type was found for performance such that a moderate punishment 
with a social account produced greater task 2 performance after accounting for task 1 
performance. Despite lacking significance, other conditions produced high task 2 
performances. This research indicates that punishment severity and account type have a 
simple relationship with the attitudinal variables and have a complex relationship with 
task performance. Future research should examine the characteristics and presentation of 
social accounts in punishment situations that maximally reduce the negative impact of 
punishment incidents.
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1Chapter 1 
Introduction
Punishment is used by workplace supervisors to control or change employees’ 
behavior. Punishment continues despite the call from management researchers to 
eliminate punishment from organizational discipline because of victims’ negative 
reactions to the administered punishment (Butterfield, Trevino, & Ball, 1996). 
Researchers propose that employees’ poor behavior should be changed and exemplary 
behavior should be maintained with positive reinforcement because no signs o f negative 
side effects will appear. Despite the fact that punishment causes negative side effects, 
three reasons have been proposed to explain why punishment continues to be used in 
organizations: (a) punishment effectively changes behaviors; (b) positive reinforcement 
is impossible to use in some situations; and (c) punishment is often more time- and cost- 
efficient (Avery & Ivancevich, 1980). Since managers are reluctant to eliminate 
punishment as their agent of behavioral change, it is important to determine how 
punishment affects employees’ perceptions of fairness and ultimately their change in 
behavior.
Bennett (1998) proposed that whenever punishment is studied the research must 
focus on two fundamental questions: (a) when will punishment be most effective at 
facilitating behavioral change and (b) when will punishment cause negative side effects? 
The most commonly researched variable associated with punishment effectiveness has 
been punishment severity. Currently, no research finding has provided ubiquitous 
support for a particular level of punishment that is most effective at behavior change. 
The most often cited finding o f the punishment research has been that intense 
punishments most effectively change undesirable behaviors (Bemiett, 1998; Church, 
1963; Johnston, 1972). Employees who are given a very strong punishment are more
2likely to apply the appropriate behavior change than employees given weak punishments. 
The employee given a strong punishment changes his/her behavior because he/she does 
not want to receive the negative outcome again. Weak punishments typically do not 
change behavior because the negative outcome from the punishment is not strong enough 
to harm the employee.
These strong punishments, despite their effectiveness at changing employee 
behavior, may cause the negative consequences found to accompany strong punishment 
events. The negative side effects that accompany punishment include avoidance, 
resentment, retaliation, and anger. These are the same reactions employees display after 
receiving unfair reward allocation decisions (e.g., layoffs, pay-cut, performance 
appraisal). Therefore, employees may react to strong punishments negatively because 
they perceive the punishment as unfair. Here lies the dilemma with punishment. First, in 
order to change an individual’s behavior, the supervisor must apply a relatively strong 
punishment. Second, if the supervisor applies a relatively strong punishment, the 
employee perceives the punishment as unfair, which results in negative reactions by the 
employee. These negative reactions then result in negative outcomes for the supervisor 
and organization. Therefore, even though the supervisor may change the undesired 
behavior with punishment, the punishment may lead to a more destructive behavior than 
the original behavior being changed. The manager must find a way to use strong 
punishments to change the undesirable behavior without causing the employee to 
perceive the punishment as unfair. One possible way managers could use strong 
punishments without causing negative reactions would be to administer a social account 
to explain why this level of punishment was given.
Employees want to know and to understand the reasons why they receive negative 
outcomes. Managers often give social accounts to help explain the reasons for the
3negative outcomes employees receive. Social accounts are verbal explanations used by a 
manager to increase employees’ acceptance of a negative outcome (Bies, 1987). 
Individuals who receive a social account in conjunction with a negative outcome 
consistently have been found to perceive the negative outcome as more fair compared to 
those individuals not receiving a social account (Bies & Shapiro, 1987). Social accounts 
may be helpful in reducing the negative side effects that accompany severe punishment, 
thereby allowing severe punishment to change behavior without resulting in negative 
reactions in the individual.
This thesis attempts to examine how two types of social accounts (ideological and 
causal) affect employees’ perceptions of a punishment’s fairness. Specifically, this 
research attempts to show how managers can use these types o f social accounts to counter 
the negative fairness perceptions and negative attitudes that accompany strong 
punishments.
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Review of Organizational Justice Research
Three types of fairness have been determined to affect individuals’ perceptions of 
justice within organizational relationships: distributive justice, procedural justice and 
interactional justice. Distributive justice theories focus on the perceived fairness 
individuals place on outcome distributions. Procedural justice theories focus on the 
perceived fairness of the procedures enacted to make an outcome decision. Interactional 
justice theories study the interpersonal relationship between the decision-maker and 
receiver of the outcome. Specifically, interactional fairness focuses on how the decision­
maker’s treatment of the employee during the enactment of the procedures affects the 
employee’s perceptions of fairness.
Distributive Justice
One of the most well-established theories of distributive justice has been Adams’ 
(1965) equity theory. Equity theory states that individuals judge the fairness of the 
outcomes they receive by comparing their input/outcome ratio to the input/outcome ratio 
of a referent other. Individuals will perceive their outcomes as fair only when their 
proportion of inputs and outcomes equals the proportion of inputs and outcomes of a 
referent other. The importance of a referent other used for making social comparisons 
was a critical aspect of this theory. Without a referent other against whom to compare 
their inputs and outcomes, individuals cannot determine the fairness of their outcome. 
Equity only occurs when the two proportions are equal. Inequality between the two 
proportions results in an individual feeling either anger (when the individual receives the 
lower proportion) or guilt (when the individual receives the larger proportion).
Therefore, individuals are motivated to balance the equity equation by actually or 
cognitively altering the referent other’s or their own inputs or outcomes.
5The evaluation that an individual makes about an outcome is based on his/her 
perceptions of outcome fairness. Specifically, Adams (1963) proposed that fairness is a 
relative state. Fairness is influenced by what the individual perceives as the appropriate 
rate of outcomes for the services rendered, and inequity only results when the individual 
psychologically judges his/her ratio of inputs and outcomes as not meeting the inputs and 
outcomes of a referent other. As a result, managers can never know how outcomes will 
affect the individual unless they are aware of the individual’s evaluative processes.
One assumption of equity theory is that individuals with positive inequity also 
work to restore equity. Individuals are motivated to restore equity even if  the inequity is 
in their favor. Adams (1963) examined how overcompensation would affect hourly and 
piece-rate subjects’ quality of work. He found that hourly overpaid subjects produced 
greater quality, and piece-rate overpaid subjects produced greater quality and lower 
quantity compared to the equitably paid subjects. Overpaid subjects altered their inputs 
by increasing the work quality in order to increase the perceived equity. Despite the 
motivation to balance positive inequity, positive inequity events result in motivational 
force that is weaker than the motivational force during a negative inequity event 
(Mowday, 1991).
Despite the frequent research support accumulated for equity theory, some major 
limitations of the theory have made its ability to predict fairness perceptions 
questionable. First, the fundamental limitation of this theory is its inability to predict 
how the individual attempts to correct the inequity. The theory cannot predict whether 
the individual cognitively distorts or physically changes his/her own or the referent 
other’s inputs or outcomes. Additionally, researchers believe that how the individual 
reduces inequity is dynamic and may not remain the same over time, resulting in more 
uncertainty about how people correct inequity (Mowday, 1991). Finally, the theory
6cannot predict how the individual decides upon the referent against which to compare 
his/her input/output ratio. Equity theory research has shown that people do care about the 
fairness o f the outcomes they receive, but the limitations accompanying these theories 
have pushed researchers to examine other areas of the outcome distribution event to 
determine how individuals perceive fairness.
Procedural Justice
The limitations of equity theory and the inability of distributive justice to predict 
individuals’ perceptions of fairness in all situations has caused researchers to examine 
other aspects of organizational justice. More recently, researchers have begun to examine 
how the procedures used to determine outcomes affect the individuals’ perceptions of 
fairness. The fairness perceptions of procedures used to determine outcomes are called 
procedural justice. The theory of procedural justice was developed by Thibaut and 
Walker (1975) through a series of studies on dispute-resolution procedures. Individuals 
were given two types of dispute-resolution procedures that differed in the type of control 
they had over the proceedings: process control -  level of control disputants were offered 
over the procedures used to settle the grievance, and decision control -  the level of 
control the individual had over the outcome decision.
Thibaut and Walker (1975) manipulated the process control by using autocratic 
and inquisitional court styles. Participants were asked to evaluate a series of grievance 
cases that contained both autocratic and inquisitional court styles. In the autocratic 
procedures, disputants had no control over the collection and presentation of the evidence 
for their case and also lacked influence in deciding the outcome of the grievance. 
Therefore, individuals in the autocratic procedures held low process control and low 
decision control. An inquisitional system allowed the disputants to gather information 
and present their case, but it did not allow the disputant any decision control. Therefore,
7inquisitional procedures gave the disputants high procedural control and low decision 
control. Disputants perceived the legal decision to be fairer, and they were more 
accepting of the decision when they were given process control (inquisitional procedures) 
compared to when they were denied process control (autocratic procedures).
In an extension of Thibaut and Walker’s (1975, 1978) original work on 
procedural justice theory, it was found that procedures are especially important to 
perceptions of fairness when the outcome is negative. This interaction has been called 
the fair-process effect (Lind & Tyler, 1988). Specifically, the fair-process effect says that 
procedures only affect perceptions of fairness when the outcome is negative. Outcomes 
are more salient to people than procedures, thus outcomes are important in determining 
fairness. As a result, there is no motivation to examine the fairness of the procedures if  
the individual received a positive outcome. On the other hand, the individual who 
receives a negative outcome is motivated to evaluate the fairness of the procedures.
When the procedures are determined to be fair, the individual will evaluate a negative 
outcome more favorably compared to individuals receiving unfair procedures. The fair- 
process effect illustrates that “outcomes and procedures work together to form a sense of 
injustice. A full understanding of fairness cannot be achieved by examining the two 
constructs separately. Rather, one needs to consider the interaction between outcomes 
and procedures” (Cropanzano & Folger, 1991, p. 79). The fair-process effect has been 
found regularly in organizational justice research across many different organizational 
settings (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996).
Many researchers have proposed that other procedural factors affect perceptions 
of procedural justice beyond that of process control. Leventhal (1980) proposed six 
procedural rules that people use to evaluate the perceptions of outcome allocation 
procedures. The six rules are: (a) consistency -  allocating procedures should be
8consistent across people and time; (b) bias suppression -  personal self-interest and blind 
allegiance to narrow preconceptions should be prevented; (c) accuracy -  decisions should 
be made on as much information as possible; (d) correctability -  opportunities must exist 
to modify and reverse decisions; (e) representativeness -  the allocation process must 
represent the concerns of all important subgroups and individuals; (f) ethicality -  the 
allocation process must be compatible with prevailing moral and ethical standards. 
Leventhal’s (1980) work has provided evidence that people care about more than their 
level of process control when evaluating procedural fairness.
Recently, two models have been developed to explain why procedural justice 
affects people. The self-interest model, also called the instrumental model, says that 
people want fair procedures because fair procedures give the individuals an opportunity 
to gain positive outcomes in the future. The group-value model attempts to explain 
procedural justice in terms of group identification (Lind & Tyler, 1988).
The self-interest model assumes that individuals are hedonistic and try to obtain 
the most favorable outcomes. Individuals tend to be unaffected by short-term negative 
outcomes if  they feel optimistic about the likelihood of receiving positive outcomes in the 
future. Individuals evaluate the procedures in order to make inferences about their future 
outcomes. Procedures that are fair and stable are more likely to result in future positive 
outcomes if  the outcomes are deserved. Unfair procedures may lead people to believe 
that decisions are made arbitrarily, and therefore, people are less certain about the 
probability of receiving future positive outcomes.
The group-value model was developed out of the inability of the self-interest 
model to explain fully the effects of procedures on reactions to allocation decisions (Lind 
& Tyler, 1988). The group-value model was developed to explain the non-instrumental 
effects of procedures on perceptions of fairness. The underlying assumption of the
9group-value model is that people value their relationships in organizations. Social 
relationships serve the function of impacting the individual’s self-esteem and self- 
identity.
The procedures that decision-makers and organizations enact inform individuals 
about their standing within the group. Individuals possess a set of values that defines 
how they should be treated, and when procedures do not match those values the 
individuals will feel they have been treated procedurally unjustly. The perception of 
procedural justice is based on an individual’s values and beliefs and is dynamic across 
individuals. The model predicts that there are some values that all people possess 
regardless of idiosyncratic value differences; those values are the belief that one should 
be treated with politeness, respect and dignity. Fairly treated individuals will feel more 
respected and proud of their group (Tyler, Degoey, & Smith, 1996). Unfair procedures 
symbolize to the members the lack of dignity and respect the organization has for them 
(Tyler, 1994). Anger often accompanies procedural violations because the employees 
feel that they have not been treated with the respect and dignity they deserved (Lind & 
Tyler, 1988). In summary, the self-interest model implies that procedures are important 
because they are a means to an end; the group-value model assumes that procedures are 
important because they are an end in and of themselves (Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996). 
Interactional Justice
An individual’s fairness perceptions are not restricted to distributive or procedural 
events, but also include how the decision-maker treats the individual interpersonally. 
Interactional justice is the quality of interpersonal treatment individuals receive during 
the enactment of the procedures (Bies, 1987). The primary thrust of organizational 
justice research has been confined to the impact of distributive and procedural justice on 
employee reactions. More recently, researchers have begun to examine how
10
interpersonal treatment affects employees’ perceptions of justice.
A study by Mikula, Petri, & Tanzer (1990) examined what types of events in 
everyday life provoked feelings of injustice. They proposed that people do not base 
fairness perceptions solely on distributions of outcomes and enactments of procedures, 
but that people also are cognizant of the interpersonal treatment by the decision-maker. 
Participants were asked in an open-ended format to describe a recent unjust event. Many 
of the reported injustices did not concern distributive or procedural events, but instead 
dealt with the manner in which the individual was interpersonally treated. The categories 
of behaviors that individuals found interpersonally unfair were (a) inconsiderate, impolite 
or aggressive behavior; (b) treatment that violates personal dignity; and (c) acts that 
indicate lack of loyalty from the other person. The implication o f this study is that people 
in their daily lives are aware of their interpersonal treatment and perceive poor treatment 
as unfair.
One criterion for examining interpersonal fairness is the manner in which the 
decision maker communicates the procedures. In two studies (Bies & Moag, 1986), a 
group of MBA job candidates were asked to recount their reactions to a corporate 
recruiting interview. In the first study, prior to participating in an interview, the MBA 
students were asked to determine the fairness procedures that they expected the recruiter 
to follow. Four communication criteria emerged: trustfulness, respect, propriety of 
questions, and adequate justification. The MBA job candidates defined each of the 
communication criteria as follows: trustfulness was the recruiter’s ability to be open and 
honest; respect was shown by the recruiter refraining from rudeness or attacking 
behaviors; impropriety of questions was defined as the candidates’ expectation that 
recruiters would not ask improper questions; and adequate justification was defined as the 
candidates’ expectation that they would receive an explanation for the decision.
11
The second study used a critical incidents technique on another group of MBA 
job candidates to gather incidents of fair or unfair interview experiences (Bies & Moag,
1986). Candidates distinguished procedural criteria from interpersonal treatment in their 
perceptions of procedural fairness. The group of MBA job candidates in this study 
determined that the same four communication criteria found in Study 1 were important in 
their perceptions of fairness. In this second study, corporate recruiters who appeared 
untrustworthy, displayed rude behavior, asked improper questions, or did not justify their 
decisions were perceived as less fair. Therefore, the way procedures are communicated 
to individuals affects their perceptions of fairness. Bies and Moag (1986) proposed that 
fairness of interpersonal treatment will be determined on an absolute standard and not via 
the social comparison that is necessary for equity theory. Specifically, if a manager 
treated you rudely, you could identify this as unfair treatment without comparing your 
treatment to a referent’s treatment.
Reactions to Injustice
Organizational justice is studied prominently in organizational research because 
the perceptions of injustice affect employees’ attitudes and job performance. Distributive 
justice, procedural justice, and interactional justice must be studied to determine how 
these injustices affect an individual’s attitudes (satisfaction with the supervisor, 
satisfaction with the organization, organizational commitment, intentions to leave) or 
behavior (retaliatory behaviors, organizational citizenship behaviors, job performance). 
Researchers have consistently found that when situations are perceived as unfair, people 
are less satisfied with the outcome and possess more negative perceptions of the event 
(Folger & Konovsky, 1989; Greenberg, 1990a). Similar reactions have been found 
across many organizational situations, and these reactions can have a profound negative 
impact on the organization or the supervisor.
12
Organizational justice research has examined how perceptions of injustice have 
affected employees’ attitudes. Folger and Konovsky (1989) examined how distributive 
and procedural justice influenced employees’ reactions to pay raise decisions. 
Interestingly, the two forms of justice did not have identical effects on people’s attitudes. 
Distributive justice was found to influence satisfaction with pay, while procedural justice 
had a significant impact on employees’ trust in the manager and organizational 
commitment. This research has shown that perceptions of outcome and procedure 
fairness do not result in identical reactions for the individual.
Perceptions of injustice will not only affect individuals’ reactions, but also their 
performance. In a selection context, Gilliland (1994) examined whether distributive and 
procedural justice would affect employees’ reactions to the selection system. In this 
laboratory experiment, a group of participants were either selected or rejected for a paid 
employment opportunity. The procedural variables were job-relatedness of the selection 
criteria and explanations given for the outcome decision. Individuals who were accepted 
for the paid position based on job-related criteria were better performers than individuals 
who were accepted based on non-job related criteria. Additionally, when the participant 
was rejected for the job, receiving an explanation influenced whether the individual 
applied for participation in a similar study or recommended a similar project to others. 
This study shows that perceptions of injustice not only can affect an individual’s attitudes 
about the outcome and process but also can affect how the individual performs on the job. 
If perceptions of justice can influence how an individual performs, then it may also affect 
other behaviors such as retaliatory behaviors.
Injustice in the workplace can bring about many undesirable effects, such as 
anger, resentment, avoidance, and retaliation. Unfair managers fail to treat subordinates 
with dignity and respect, and individuals treated without dignity and respect retaliate for
13
this value violation with “reciprocal deviance” (Kemper, 1966). Reciprocal deviance 
refers to the manager treating employees unfairly, and the employees reciprocating this 
unfair treatment by acting against the manager or organization in a destructive manner.
Greenberg (1990a) attempted to study the conditions under which employees 
retaliate during times of underpayment. More specifically, Greenberg wanted to know 
how an adequate or inadequate explanation for a pay cut would affect the employees’ 
theft behavior. The adequate explanation was believed to represent higher level of 
procedural fairness than the inadequate explanation. Employees who were given an 
inadequate explanation were found to steal more from the organization than were the 
employees who received adequate explanations. This finding implies that levels of overt 
retaliatory behavior increase when the individual perceives the situation as procedurally 
unjust.
Unlike the overt retaliatory behaviors of stealing that occurred in Greenberg’s 
(1990a) study, people can react to injustices with more covert retaliatory behaviors to 
punish the organization. Organizational Retaliatory Behaviors (ORBs) are subtle 
retaliations that decrease the efficiency of the organization. In Skarlicki and Folger 
(1997), these behaviors included wasting company material, calling in sick when not ill, 
disobeying supervisor’s instructions, failing to give coworkers required information, just 
to name a few. Skarlicki and Folger (1997) predicted that ORBs would increase when 
perceptions of injustice were high. They found that when distributive, procedural and 
interactional justice were perceived to be low, the number of retaliatory behaviors was 
the highest.
In summary, research has found that perceptions of injustice influence attitudes, 
performance, and retaliatory behaviors. These cognitive and behavioral reactions to the 
injustice have financial and motivational implications for the organization, and as a
14
result, managers must find a way to increase employees’ perceptions of justice in spite of 
the finite resources within organizations. One way that managers have begun managing 
the impressions of outcomes within organizations has been with the use of social 
accounts (Greenberg, 1988).
Social Accounts
People who feel that they have been treated unfairly will feel morally outraged, 
and this results in feelings of anger and frustration (Bies, 1987). Managers must find 
some method to manage the impressions of the situation’s fairness so that employees do 
not experience these emotions in the face of unfair outcomes. Much of the recent 
research has examined how social accounts reduce the negative reactions people 
experience when outcomes are perceived to be unfair. A social account can be defined as 
a verbal strategy that a decision-maker can use to minimize the severity of the decision or 
to convince the individual that the wrongful act was not truly what the decision-maker 
was “really like” as a person (Bies, 1987). The impact of social accounts may be the 
result of people’s need to understand the situations affecting them. People have been 
characterized as “intuitive jurists,” meaning that they want to know the specific reasons 
for an apparent injustice so that they can judge whether they have been treated fairly 
(Bies, 1987). The four types of social accounts that managers can use are: (a) causal, (b) 
ideological, (c) referential, and (d) penitential.
A causal account is an explanation that attempts to reduce the perceived 
responsibility of the decision-maker for the injustice. Causal accounts are often referred 
to as excuses. The most common way for managers to reduce their responsibility for the 
outcome would be to claim mitigating circumstances caused the injustice, or more 
specifically, the injustice was not the decision maker’s fault. For example, “My boss told 
me I had to punish you for performing poorly.” In essence, the decision-maker is
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pointing out through the social account that another decision-maker would make the same 
decision, and therefore, the employee should not feel negatively towards him/her.
An ideological account attempts to legitimize the action by putting the action in 
the larger organizational framework. An ideological account is also referred to as a 
justification. The decision-maker acknowledges his/her responsibility for the decision by 
explaining that the decision was the “right thing to do.” Managers enacting ideological 
accounts do so by appealing to superordinate goals or labeling the decision in more 
value-laden terms. Through the use of superordinate goals and invoking value-laden 
terms, the decision-maker hopes to change the victim’s schema used to evaluate the 
injustice (Bies, 1987). An example might be a manager who tells a punished subordinate 
that the punishment was necessary to put him/her on the right track so that the team can 
be more efficient.
Referential accounts influence perceptions of injustice by comparing employee’s 
treatment or outcomes to the treatment or outcomes that others have received. There are 
three basic types o f referential accounts: (a) social, (b) temporal, and (c) aspirational.
The social type uses social comparison information to point out to the individual that 
his/her outcomes are not as bad as others’ outcomes. The temporal type provides the 
person with information that suggests that the situation will be better in the future.
Finally, the aspirational type explains to the individual that his/her original expectations 
are unrealistic and helps to change his/her expectations.
A penitential account, commonly referred to as an apology, is an expression of 
remorse by the harm-doer for the negative outcome. Penitential accounts represent an 
enactment o f self-retribution as a partial payment for the injustice that has occurred (Bies,
1987). As a result o f such partial payments, the manager expects the victim to see 
him/her more favorably.
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Researchers have found an extensive amount of experimental support for the use 
of social accounts for impression-management purposes. Researchers have most often 
examined the mitigating effects of causal accounts. One of the first systematic studies of 
causal accounts was performed as part of three studies by Bies and Shapiro (1987). In 
Study 1 the participants of the laboratory experiment were given a scenario that explained 
how their supervisor had used his subordinate’s idea to gain recognition from the top 
management. Participants either received or did not receive a causal account explaining 
the reason why the subordinate’s idea was used. The participants were then asked to act 
as an arbitrator for the case. Participants judged the interactional fairness and 
appropriateness of the managerial decision to be higher when a causal account was given 
as a justification for the manager’s conduct.
Study 2 attempted to replicate the above-mentioned findings of Study 1 in the 
context of a sales purchase decision and a budget proposal decision. Participants were 
given one of two contextual scenarios. In the sales context, the salesperson received a 
smaller than expected sale; in the budget context, a manager received a smaller than 
requested budget. This study supported the findings from Study 1 in that interactional 
fairness and acceptance of the managerial decision was higher when a causal account was 
given. More importantly, this study found that in order for the causal account to be 
effective, it must be perceived as adequate.
Study 3 attempted to replicate the findings of the previous laboratory studies in a 
field setting and also examined how causal accounts influenced the judgments of 
procedural fairness. Participants were asked to recount an incident when they had a 
proposal or policy rejected by their boss. They were then asked to measure the adequacy 
of the account, interactional fairness, procedural fairness, approval of the boss, and 
affective reactions. The results replicated the previous findings of Studies 1 and 2 in the
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field setting. In addition, only adequate causal accounts were found to influence 
perceptions of procedural justice. The conclusion was made that adequacy of the causal 
account, rather than the claim of the account, was what impacted the perceptions of 
interactional and procedural justice.
An empirical review of the state of social account research by Bies and Sitkin 
(Bies, 1989; Bies & Sitkin, 1992; Sitkin & Bies, 1993) has found that many variables 
influence the effects of social accounts. The most frequently examined characteristic that 
influences a social account’s effectiveness is adequacy. A series of studies by Folger and 
his colleagues (Folger & Martin, 1986; Folger, Rosenfield, & Robinson, 1983) found that 
adequate accounts were required when reward distribution procedures were changed. In 
the study by Folger et al. (1983), participants took part in a winner-take-all competition in 
which the procedures for distributing the outcomes were set before the start o f the 
competition. At the end of the competition, all participants were informed that they had 
lost the competition because the procedures for outcome distribution had changed. 
Participants who received adequate explanations for the change in procedure expressed 
less discontent for the decision.
In Folger & Martin’s (1986) follow-up study, participants were denied a favorable 
outcome because of the boss’s actions, and an adequate or inadequate reason was given 
for the decision. The authors found that participants were more accepting of the decision 
when an adequate explanation was given. Specifically, participants were less resentful 
and more willing to recommend the experimenter for a permanent job as a research 
assistant when adequate accounts were used to legitimize the boss’s decision.
In a field study, Bies, Shapiro, and Cummings (1988) attempted to determine how 
causal accounts would affect an individual’s reaction to a rejection of a proposal or 
request. The participants were asked to recount a specific incident in which the boss
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rejected a request. The variables measured in the study were predicted to result in 
conflict within the organization (anger, disapproval with the boss, and complaints to 
higher-ups). As found in previously cited studies, adequacy of the account was 
negatively correlated with the negative reactions to the decision. As a result, when an 
account was given, negative outcomes had less impact on variables that caused 
organizational conflict.
Interestingly, this study was one of the first to look beyond adequacy in 
determining the effectiveness of causal accounts. Support was also found for the 
importance of the boss’s sincerity in communicating the account. Therefore, the study 
found that people take into consideration both the adequacy and sincerity of the account, 
instead of simply the claim o f mitigating circumstances, when making their affective 
reactions to the injustice.
Additionally, the content of the account was found to be important. Managers 
were found to communicate many types of mitigating circumstances when using causal 
accounts, but they were not perceived to be equal by employees. Accounts focusing on 
company norms, budget constraints, or formal company policies were perceived to be 
more adequate than those focused on employee behavior, upper management, or political 
environment. The authors concluded that mitigating circumstances that focus on 
impersonal criteria would be perceived as more adequate. The implication from this 
study is that many variables besides adequacy may influence the effectiveness of social 
accounts.
In a series of three studies, Shapiro, Buttner, & Barry (1994) examined a set of 
variables that were predicted to affect the perceived adequacy of an account. Study 1 
examined how perceived concern, perceived reasonableness, and outcome severity 
affected an explanation’s perceived adequacy. Participants were instructed to recall an
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interview with both a company they strongly desired to join and a company they did not 
desire to join. Outcome severity was manipulated by including groups that strongly 
desired to join the company and a group that did not desire to join the company. The 
perceived concern of the decision-maker was not found to affect adequacy significantly, 
but the perceived reasonableness of the explanation did affect perceived adequacy. 
Therefore, the substance of the explanation may be more important to the perceived 
adequacy than the manner in which it is communicated. Additionally, situational 
variables such as the severity of the outcome also affected the adequacy of the account. 
The greater the severity of the outcome, the more difficult it was for an explanation to be 
perceived as adequate. Thus, explanations were more effective when the outcome 
severity was low. In conclusion, the adequacy of an account was affected by the message 
of the account and the level of outcome severity.
Study 3 examined how an explainer’s sincerity, an explanation’s specificity, and 
outcome severity interacted to influence the perceived adequacy of the explanation. 
Individuals in the high specificity condition received specific personalized information, 
while the low specificity condition received a small amount of impersonal information. 
The high sincerity condition contained a personalized letter (with a personalized 
signature) expressing concern, understanding, and an offer for help; while the low 
sincerity condition did not. Participants in the high severity condition were told that the 
failing grade they received came in a required class, and as a result, they would not 
graduate that semester. In the low severity condition, the participants were allowed to 
graduate because the failing grade was not in a required class. An unexpected two-way 
interaction emerged between sincerity and specificity: adequacy was the highest when 
sincerity and specificity were the highest. Therefore, an explanation’s adequacy was 
affected by both the explanation’s content and the manner in which the explanation was
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communicated. Interestingly, this study did not replicate the low-severity effect found in 
Study 1.
Social accounts have been found to mitigate the negative reactions to injustice 
outside the laboratory setting. Greenberg (1990a), as previously mentioned, studied how 
employee theft behavior would be affected by the implementation of an adequate 
account. Employees in three different plants had their salary cut by 15%. Employees 
were given either an adequate explanation (president of the company explained in detail 
the reasons for the decision and answered questions) or an inadequate explanation 
(president of the company gave no explanation and answered no questions). Employees 
who received an inadequate explanation stole significantly more than they did prior to the 
pay reduction. Additionally, employees who received an adequate explanation also stole 
more than they did prior to the pay-cut. However, employees who received an adequate 
explanation stole less than the employees who received inadequate explanations. As a 
result, explanations were more effective than no explanations at reducing negative 
reactions, but they were not as effective as giving fair outcomes. During the pay 
reduction period, the inadequate explanation group had significantly more theft behavior 
than did the adequate explanation group. The implication of this study is that employers 
should distribute fair outcomes whenever possible, but when the fair distribution is not 
possible, the next most effective solution is to give an adequate explanation for the 
outcome.
Bies and Shapiro (1988) used two studies to examine how voice opportunities and 
a managerial justification would interact to influence perceptions of procedural justice.
In a laboratory setting, Study 1 examined how procedures that allowed no voice or voice 
and receiving an account or no account would affect an individual’s reactions to a job 
recruitment decision. Participants read a description of an interview procedure that the
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job candidate went through where the job candidate was given either voice or no voice 
opportunity and a rejection letter that contained either justification or no justification for 
the decision. Voice and justification were shown to have independent effects on 
perceptions o f procedural justice. If voice and justifications have independent effects, 
then it might be possible to use social accounts to increase perceptions of fairness even if  
other procedural variables are unjust.
Study 2 attempted to replicate the findings of Study 1 in the context of a 
budgetary decision. Participants were asked to describe a recent rejection of a budget 
request by their boss. The presence or absence of a voice opportunity was measured on a 
7-point scale by one criterion, “opportunity to persuade your boss by fully presenting 
your position.” Additionally, two items were used to measure the presence or absence of 
an account; “boss attempted to provide justification” and “boss claimed that the 
circumstances were beyond his or her control”. Study 2 found that people perceived 
voice procedures as fairer than mute procedures, and justification situations as fairer than 
nonjustification situations for unfair budget decision-making as well as unfair job 
recruitment situations. These two studies show that justifications have an effect on 
perceptions o f fairness even when procedures are unjust.
The social accounts literature has supported the impact of both causal accounts 
and an account’s perceived adequacy on employees’ reactions to injustice. Despite the 
overwhelming support for using causal accounts provided by these studies, only one 
study was found that compared the effectiveness of two different types of accounts in the 
same study. Bobocel and Farrell (1996) examined the influence of both ideological and 
causal accounts on white males’ perceptions of interactional fairness in the context of an 
Affirmative Action decision. The authors tested two hypotheses: (a) interactional 
fairness would be highest in the ideological account condition, when the employer takes
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responsibility for the decision and provides a justification legitimizing the decision; and 
(b) adequacy would be a partial mediator of the relationship between the social accounts 
and interactional fairness. The authors proposed that ideological accounts would increase 
the white males’ perceptions of interactional fairness. In an ideological account, the 
decision-maker assumes responsibility and attempts to justify the decision for the 
outcome. Since the underlying goal of the ideological account is to legitimize the 
outcome by appealing to a superordinate goal, the reasoning for the received outcome 
will be perceived as objective rather than arbitrary. Causal accounts, on the other hand, 
claim that the outcome was due to mitigating circumstances and may not have been seen 
as a viable explanation for the outcome. Casual accounts will be seen as more arbitrary 
than ideological accounts (Bobocel & Farrell, 1996).
Ideological accounts were found to increase perceptions of interactional fairness 
more than the causal or no account conditions. Surprisingly, causal accounts were not 
even as effective at increasing interactional fairness as the no account condition. Based 
on this study’s findings then, it could be concluded that causal accounts may not be as 
effective as providing no account at all. The overwhelming support for causal accounts 
in previous research, however, make this bold conclusion inappropriate.
The second hypothesis of this study (adequacy would partially mediate the 
account’s impact on interactional fairness) was also supported. After adequacy was 
controlled for, the overall variance accounted for by the account conditions was reduced 
from 16% to 10% . Therefore, adequacy partially mediates the effect of social accounts, 
but the accounts may also have their own unique effect. Bobocel and Farrell (1996) 
concluded, “there must be something more than just adequacy that contributes to the 
participant’s ratings of interactional fairness in the ideological account condition” (p. 28).
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Additionally, ideological accounts may be more effective because of their ability 
to signal respect for the employee, something causal accounts may not be able to do. For 
example, an explanation in which the decision-maker takes responsibility for his/her 
actions and appeals to a superordinate goal presumably conveys more respect and dignity 
than does an explanation that denies responsibility and blames the outcome on mitigating 
circumstances. Therefore, the group-value model may help explain the difference in the 
fairness-enhancing effects of the ideological account over the causal account.
Interaction of Outcome Severity and Social Accounts
Outcome severity is a variable that also has been found to affect the relationship 
between social accounts and an individual’s fairness perceptions. In Folger and 
Cropanzano’s (1998) model of social accounts, outcome severity was predicted to 
moderate this social account-outcome fairness relationship. Research has found support 
for two different effects of outcome severity: the high-severity effect and the low- 
severity effect. The low-severity effect states that the social account is most effective 
(that is, more able to reduce perceived injustice and negative reactions) when the 
outcome is relatively mild. Specifically, an account is less effective when the individual 
receives an extremely negative outcome, and most effective when the individual is 
impacted minimally by the outcomes. Therefore, small problems are easier for managers 
to explain away than large ones (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998).
Three studies have provided support for the low-severity effect. First, as 
mentioned in the prior section, Shapiro et al. (1994) found that social accounts were 
perceived to be more adequate when the outcomes received were less damaging 
compared to outcomes that were more damaging. Maier and Lavrakas (1976) examined 
when individuals would be receptive to an apology for a co-worker’s lie. Individuals 
would accept the apology more readily when the co-worker’s lie did not cost them much
24
money, therefore rendering the lie less costly to them. Finally, Johnson and Rule (1986) 
examined individuals’ reactions to being severely or mildly insulted. Individuals who 
received severe insults were found to be less accepting of the social account, while 
individuals who received mild insults viewed the account in a more accepting manner. 
These studies support the low-severity effect prediction that social accounts have a more 
positive impact when the outcome received is less damaging to the individual.
The high-severity effect states that accounts are most effective when the outcome 
is most severe. The high-severity effect elicits a similar interaction as the fair-process 
effect (discussed in the procedural justice section): when outcomes are negative, 
procedures are used to determine fairness. Therefore, in situations in which outcomes are 
perceived as severely negative, a social account is needed to mitigate the damaging 
effects of the situation. Greenberg (1994) garnered the high-severity effect in a study that 
examined heavy-, light- and non-smokers’ reactions to a smoking ban. Heavy smokers 
were perceived to be most affected by the implementation of a smoking ban, and thus 
were predicted to perceive the smoking ban as most severe. As predicted, heavy smokers 
did find the smoking ban more harmful. Greenberg found that when the heavy smokers 
were given an adequate explanation for the smoking ban, however, they had the biggest 
change in their acceptance of the smoking ban compared to the light- and non-smokers.
Cropanzano and Konovsky (1995) examined how different levels of perceived 
severity would affect an employee’s perceptions of the fairness of an employee drug 
screening. A severe outcome condition in this study was defined as a person who, after 
being tested positive for drug use, was treated like a criminal; the mild outcome condition 
was defined as a person who, after being tested positive for drug use, was given 
rehabilitation for their addiction. The authors found that when little justification was 
given for treating the individual like a criminal, perceptions of drug testing fairness were
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low, but when high justification was given, a higher perception of drug testing fairness 
resulted.
One reason for the increased effectiveness of social accounts in the high-severity 
condition may be that an explanation helps a person understand the reasons for the harsh 
outcome. Conversely, when the outcome is weak and not perceived to be severe, there is 
no reason for people to change their attitudes toward the outcome, both because the 
outcome has no real effect on them and because the punishment is not seen as unjust.
The harsh outcome, on the other hand, does have a strong effect on the individual; 
without some reasoning for the punishment, the individual can only see the outcome as 
unfair.
Finally, Folger and Cropanzano (1998) proposed that the severity of the outcome 
has a curvilinear effect on the effectiveness of the social accounts. By a curvilinear 
relationship the authors mean that when the outcome severity is low, the social account 
may not be needed to change the perceptions of the injustice because this outcome does 
not affect the employee and is not seen as unjust. As the outcome severity increases, the 
individual becomes more emotionally distraught by the outcome, and the social account 
may help lessen the emotional reactions. The outcome severity may hit a certain 
threshold, at which point the social account becomes effective at mitigating the effects of 
the injustice. Finally, if  outcome severity became too severe, the individual may perceive 
the outcome as extremely unjust and may perceive an explanation as inadequate for 
justifying the negative outcome he/she received. Thus, merely an explanation for the 
extremely severe outcome is not enough to exonerate the injustice.
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Chapter 3 
Review of Punishment Research
Punishment as a concept has been studied for many decades, but not much of this 
research has been conducted in organizational settings. Punishment within an 
organizational context can be defined as a superior’s application of a negative 
consequence or removal of a positive consequence following a subordinate’s undesirable 
behaviors (Butterfield, Trevino, & Ball, 1996). Subordinates’ undesirable behaviors take 
two forms: poor performance and antisocial behavior.
Wheeler (1976) reviewed 339 arbitration cases reported in the Law Arbitration 
Report between 1970 and 1974 and classified the cases into categories based on the types 
o f offenses or undesirable behaviors that were punished. The categories that emerged 
were the following: (a) absenteeism, tardiness, leaving early; (b) dishonesty, theft, 
falsification of records; (c) incompetence, negligence, poor workmanship, violation of 
safety regulations; (d) illegal strikes, strike violence, deliberate restriction of production; 
(e) intoxication, bringing intoxicant to work; (f) fighting, horseplay, troublemaking; (g) 
insubordination, refusal of job assignment, refusal to work overtime, fights or altercations 
with supervisor; (h) miscellaneous rule violations.
Robinson and Greenberg (1998) defined six different types of antisocial behavior, 
including (a) workplace deviance; (b) antisocial behavior; (c) employee vice; (d) 
organizational misbehavior; (e) workplace aggression; (f) non-complaint behavior. 
Managers want to eliminate poor performance and antisocial behavior from their 
organizations because of the economic and motivational effects these behaviors have on 
the organization.
Robinson and Greenberg (1998) cite five organizational statistics that clearly 
illustrate the detrimental effects of antisocial behavior and poor performance: (a)
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seventy-five percent of employees have stolen from their employers at least once; (b) 
from one-third to three-quarters of all employees have engaged in some type of fraud, 
vandalism, or sabotage in their workplaces; (c) forty-two percent of women have 
experienced sexual harassment at the workplace; (d) almost twenty-five percent of 
employees have admitted knowledge of illegal drug use among employees; and (e) seven 
percent of employees have been threatened with physical violence while on the job.
These statistics illustrate the extensive nature of poor performance and antisocial 
behavior occurring within organizations. These behaviors create a damaging economic 
effect on the organization through theft, vandalism and poor performance; these 
behaviors can also impact morale and indirectly affect the company’s profits. Individuals 
who are sexually harassed or threatened with violence may decrease satisfaction and 
commitment to the company which may result in their decreasing work performance or 
leaving the company. Therefore, it is in a manager’s best interest to find an effective way 
to eliminate or change the undesirable behaviors.
Much of the study of punishment has examined the most effective methods to 
change behavior, and specifically, how different levels of punishment severity affect 
individuals’ likelihood of changing undesirable behaviors. Bennett (1998) proposed that 
there are two consequences of punishment: (a) it will change behavior and (b) it will 
result in negative side effects in the punished individual. First, the conditions under 
which punishments will change behaviors will be discussed.
Impact of Punishment on Undesired Behaviors
Before attempting to determine the conditions under which punishment is most 
effective, it is important to determine if punishment has been found to change behaviors 
at all. Kempen and Hall (1977) attempted to control absenteeism behavior by using a 
system of both rewards and punishments. Positive reinforcement was differentially
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applied, that is, employees received positive reinforcement for regular attendance, and 
employees with poor attendance received punishment. The results found that after this 
system was implemented the level of absenteeism decreased. Similar results for a mixed 
discipline system were also found by Kopelman and Schneller (1982). The authors 
attempted to use this system to control the amount of overtime and unscheduled absences 
for medical center employees. This system resulted in a 54% decrease in the amount of 
overtime and significantly decreased the amount of unscheduled absences. From these 
two studies, it can be concluded that a system that combines both rewards and 
punishments to change undesirable behaviors is effective, but how effective can 
punishment be at changing undesirable behavior if  it is used by itself?
Baum and Youngblood (1975) examined the effects of a classroom attendance 
policy in which the students were punished for missing classes. Punishment was found to 
increase the level of attendance behavior over that of the no punishment condition. 
Additionally, punishment also has been found to decrease unethical behavior, even if the 
unethical behavior is being reinforced (Hegarty & Sims, 1978). Punishment can 
therefore have a very powerful effect on changing employees’ undesirable behaviors.
Brass and Oldham (1976) examined supervisors’ use of punishment as a 
motivational tool to increase employees’ work performance and motivation. They found 
that Personally Rewarding and Personally Punishing motivational strategies were 
positively related to eight measures of employee effectiveness. Personally Punishing 
strategies were significantly related to 7 of the 8 measures of effectiveness, while 
Personally Rewarding strategies were only related to 3 of the 8 measures of effectiveness. 
These results show that punishment can be as effective or even more effective than 
reward allocations at increasing the effectiveness of employees. In summary, research 
has shown that punishments are effective both when delivered in combination with
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rewards and when delivered by themselves. Despite all the literature examining the 
effects of punishment on undesirable behaviors, little research has examined the 
conditions under which punishment is most effective at changing undesirable behaviors. 
Punishment Severity
Thus far, the majority of the research on punishment has looked at how the 
severity of punishments affects levels of performance. Severity of punishment appears to 
be a very important variable that affects behavioral change, but studies of punishment 
have not produced consistent results. One recurring finding has been that more intense 
punishments result in the greatest amount of behavioral change (Church, 1963; Johnston, 
1972; Skinner, 1953; Walters & Grusac, 1977).
From his work within a therapy setting, Johnston (1972) outlined ten guidelines 
for effectively changing behaviors through punishment. Two of the guidelines dealt with 
the severity of punishment. First, Johnston proposed that the initial intensity of the 
punishment should be as powerful as possible, and that this level of punishment should 
be administered for as long as possible. Second, he suggested that if only a moderate 
level of punishment could be administered, then long periods of the punishment should 
be used. Thus, from this research it could be concluded that the most effective way to 
change undesirable behaviors was through the administration of the most severe 
punishment possible. Researchers who find support for the use of strong punishments 
reason that more intense punishment suppresses behaviors because individuals do not 
want to be given this level of punishment again (Church, 1963; Johnston, 1972; Skinner, 
1953; Walters & Grusac, 1977). They also hypothesize that weaker punishment will be 
ineffective at deterring undesirable behaviors because this level of punishment will have 
no dire consequences for the individual.
Bennett (1998) found that behavioral change was related to the level of outcome
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severity. Participants who were given less severe punishments were less likely to change 
their behaviors compared to those who were given more severe punishments. Bennett 
concluded that the low levels of punishment did not act as a deterrent to performing the 
undesirable behavior, and simply the act of applying punishment was not enough to 
change the behavior. The implication from this study is that in order for the punishment 
to be effective, it must be intense.
In contrast, a second finding has been that the level of punishment severity was 
irrelevant to the amount o f behavioral change (Leon, 1981; Rimm & Masters, 1979). It 
was proposed by Leon (1981) that the application of the punishment was what caused the 
behavioral change and not the punishment’s level of intensity. In other words, low levels 
of punishment would bring about exactly the same amount of behavior change as would 
moderately or extremely intense punishments. Little additional empirical evidence has 
been found to support these findings.
The third possible relationship between punishment severity and performance 
change states that a moderate level of punishment severity may be most effective in 
changing undesirable behaviors. Avery and Ivancevich (1980), in a commentary 
regarding the state of punishment research in organizations, reasoned that punishment can 
only be effective in changing behaviors at a moderate intensity level. They surmised that 
if  the punishment were too intense compared to the undesirable behavior, then the 
employee would become so upset that he/she would not feel obligated to change that 
behavior. For example, an employee who is suspended for one week after being tardy 
once would probably perceive the punishment as extremely unfair, and he/she would not 
attempt to change this behavior. On the other hand, if  the punishment is not harsh 
enough, the individual would not view the punishment as a deterrent and would thus 
continue to perform the undesirable behavior. A moderate level of punishment would be
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strong enough to deter the behavior from occurring, but not too intense to cause 
resentment and not too weak to result in a lack o f change in behavior.
Currently, no studies have been found to support Avery and Ivancevich’s 
prediction. Additionally, none of the studies cited in my study specifically examined 
how the individual receiving the punishment perceived its severity. Severity is a relative 
state, so it is essential for researchers to determine at what levels people perceive 
punishment as high, medium or low. Authors have not commented on how high levels of 
punishments have been defined; is a high level of punishment synonymous with severe 
punishments, or are high-level punishments simply more intense than an appropriately 
intense punishment. In these other studies, the label the authors placed on certain levels 
of punishment may have misrepresented the perceived level of punishment the 
individuals received. If  high-intensity punishments are defined as severe punishments, 
then Avery and Ivancevich’s proposal may be valid, and high punishments would 
decrease behavior change. On the other hand, if  high punishment is not defined as 
severe, then high punishments may increase behavior change.
Empirical evidence has shown that punishment can be effective in changing 
employees’ undesirable behaviors, but much of the management literature instructs 
supervisors to eliminate punishment from their disciplinary system. The reason for the 
push to eliminate punishment from organizations is because of the perceived negative 
side effects of the punishment on the individual.
Negative Outcomes of Punishment
The second part of Bennett’s (1998) proposed consequences of punishment was 
that punishment resulted in negative consequences for the punished. The belief by most 
researchers has been that punishment causes the victim to develop anger, resentment, 
avoidance, and retaliatory behaviors towards the punishing agent; in an organizational
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context, the punishing agent would be the supervisor or the organization (Luthans, 1995; 
Moorehead & Griffin, 1995; Northcraft & Neale, 1994; Organ & Hammer, 1983). Avery 
and Ivancevich (1980) reviewed previous punishment research studies and concluded that 
punishment will result in anxiety, aggressive acts, passivity, and withdrawal. 
Additionally, punishment may lead to escape or avoidance by the victim. These 
behaviors could have a detrimental effect on the supervisor-subordinate relationship. 
Parke (1972) found that undesirable side effects were only manifested when the 
individual was punished indiscriminately or harshly. Therefore, negative side effects 
occurred only when the punishment was not contingent on the behavior or the 
punishment was too severe compared to the punishable behavior.
More recent studies have continued to examine individuals’ reactions to the 
presentation of punishment within an organizational setting. Baron (1988) compared the 
reactions of individuals receiving destructive criticism against individuals receiving 
constructive criticism. Participants in the study were instructed to develop a company’s 
ad campaign for a new line of shampoo that would be introduced soon. Participants were 
either given constructive criticism in which the comments about the ad campaign were 
specific in content and considerate in tone, and no attributions were made about the 
reasons for the poor performance and no threats were made; or destructive criticism in 
which participants received general remarks in which the comments were inconsiderate, 
attributed the poor performance to the individual, and threatened the individual. 
Destructive criticism had a profound effect on the participant’s emotional and behavioral 
reactions. Individuals receiving destructive criticism were more inflexible to the 
suggestions, showed more avoidance, felt angrier, felt tenser, and were less likely to 
collaborate. The implication of this study is that severe punishments have a negative 
emotional effect on the victim, and thus will result in behaviors that are detrimental to the
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organization.
Ball, Trevino, and Sims (1994) examined how fair and unfair punishments 
affected employee performance and citizenship behaviors. Recently punished employees 
from 20 different organizations were asked to complete a questionnaire about the 
punishment event. Harsh punishments were found to have a strong impact on subsequent 
performance and retaliatory behaviors. When the punishment was perceived to be overly 
harsh, employees rated the anticitizenship measure significantly higher than the 
organizational citizenship measure, which meant that the individual was more likely to 
have covertly retaliated since the punishment incident’s occurrence. Some examples of 
items included in the anticitizenship measure included: lying in order to get the boss into 
trouble, sabotaging the work of co-workers, and purposely interfering with someone else 
doing his/her job. Additionally, this study found that when punishment was too harsh, 
individuals were less likely to change their own behaviors. The performance measure 
examined the extent to which the individual’s work performance had taken a turn for the 
better and/or whether the individual had stopped performing the undesirable behaviors. 
Therefore, this measure tapped both types of punishable behaviors: poor performance 
and antisocial behaviors. The importance of this study is that it illustrated that overly 
severe punishments have had a detrimental effect on the performance that managers were 
trying to eliminate or change and have resulted in retaliatory behavior.
In summary, punishments do have negative side effects on individuals. The side 
effects often include anger, resentment, avoidance and retaliation. These side effects are 
especially evident when the punishment is extremely severe, yet most of the punishment 
literature found that highly severe punishments are needed to change behavior 
effectively. In this dilemma lies the paradox of punishment. Managers can change the 
behaviors they find undesirable, but new negative emotions and behaviors may occur as a
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result o f the punishment needed to change the original unwanted behavior. In order for 
punishment to be a successful method of changing behavior, managers must use 
punishment in a way that changes behaviors without producing the negative side effects. 
An exciting avenue to explore to solve this dilemma is to examine individuals’ 
perceptions of justice during punishment incidents.
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Chapter 4
Punishment and Organizational Justice 
One organizational context that has not been extensively studied via justice theory 
has been organizational punishment (Avery & Jones, 1985). Very few studies have 
examined how individuals perceive the fairness of punishment events. Greenberg 
(1990b) proposed that a very promising avenue of research would be to apply procedural 
justice theory to issues of employee discipline.
Sampson (1986) proposed that individuals see punishment through the eyes of 
justice. If people cognitively evaluate punishment in terms of fairness, then people 
should have the same reactions to unfair punishment as they do to unfair reward 
allocations. It does appear plausible that people evaluate the fairness of punishment 
events as they do reward allocations because both outcomes, when unfair, elicit negative 
reactions from the recipients. Unfair reward allocations and punishment cause people to 
react with negative attitudes (lower commitment, lower satisfaction), negative emotions 
(anger), poorer performance, and/or retaliatory behaviors. Previous research on fairness 
and reward allocation research has found that people will perceive the outcome as fair 
even if it was negative as long as fair procedures were used. Therefore, a similar 
application of procedural justice may affect an individual’s perception of a punishment’s 
fairness. In particular, certain types of social accounts may be effective at eliminating the 
negative side effects of punishment.
Much of the introductory research examining the effects of procedural justice 
variables on reactions to punishment has studied aspects of punishment consistency. 
Consistency of outcome decisions is a procedural justice variable proposed by Leventhal 
(1980). If this procedural variable affected individuals’ perceptions of fairness, then the 
possibility exists that other procedural variables may also affect individuals’ perceptions
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of fairness. Avery, Davis, and Nelson (1984) surveyed a group of refinery workers about 
their perceptions of their supervisors’ discipline behaviors. Particularly, they wanted to 
know how the disciplinary behavior affected job satisfaction. The results support their 
hypothesis that people who are given consistent punishments have a greater level of job 
satisfaction than people who are given inconsistent punishments. The authors also found 
that when the punishment was administered in an inappropriate manner -  childishly, in a 
petty manner, or in an angry fashion -  job satisfaction was decreased. Unfortunately, this 
study did not examine the perceived level o f fairness, so no conclusion can be made 
about whether consistency affects perceptions of fairness, but based on its effect on job 
satisfaction, consistency should have an effect on procedural justice.
Bennett and Cummings (1991) examined how the schedule of punishment 
affected people’s performance on a proofreading task. Procedural justice theory 
hypothesizes that aversive consequences delivered on a fixed ratio or continuous 
schedule results in fewer undesirable behaviors than would a variable ratio schedule. The 
authors found that continuous punishment and a fixed ratio schedule of punishment did 
not significantly differ in the number of errors they produced, but the fixed ratio group 
had significantly fewer errors than the variable ratio group. Unlike much of the early 
punishment literature that suggested that in order to be effective, punishment must be 
administered after each incident (Azrin & Holtz, 1966; Johnston, 1972; Parke, 1972), this 
study demonstrated that punishments will be effective as long as they are on a consistent 
schedule.
Bennett (1998) used two in-basket exercises to determine if punishment could be 
used to change behavior without causing negative side effects (anger and retaliation). 
Bennett examined how the magnitude and consistency of punishments for giving 
distributors kickbacks would affect behavior change, anger, and retaliatory behaviors.
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Interestingly, the magnitude of the punishment influenced the level of behavior change, 
while the consistency didn’t, thus supporting the contention in previous literature that 
high magnitude punishments are needed to change behavior. Both consistency and 
magnitude had a significant effect on levels o f anger, but individuals were angrier when 
they received inconsistent rather than severe punishments. Consistency also had an effect 
on the level of aggression and retaliatory behavior the individual enacted. Individuals 
who received inconsistent punishments were more likely to act aggressively against a 
competitor and against a subordinate than were individuals receiving consistent 
punishments. The implication of this study was that the level of punishment and the 
procedures with which it is administered has differing effects on the individual. 
Specifically, higher levels of punishment are needed to change behavior, and fair 
procedures are needed to reduce anger and retaliatory behaviors.
The impact of the previous three articles has not been simply the finding that 
consistency is important when administering punishments. The most important finding 
of these studies has been that people use procedures to determine the fairness of severe 
punishment. Additionally, fair procedures appear to be a necessity in order to reduce the 
negative side effects that accompany negative punishments. Also, a solid conclusion 
could be made based on these studies that punishments always should be applied 
consistently. Unfortunately, punishments cannot always be administered consistently 
because of the dynamics of organizational settings; not all situations are exactly the same, 
so other aspects of punishment procedures also must be examined to find out if  they have 
similar effects on individuals’ reactions to punishment.
Ball, Trevino, Sims (1993) developed a model of subordinates’ attitudes in 
response to punishment incidents. The authors proposed that negative attitudinal 
reactions that occur during punishment are a result of the perceptions of unfair
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punishment. Therefore, the model was developed to explore the variables that affect 
subordinate attitudes to punishment. This model is important because it was the first 
model to examine punishment events through an organizational justice framework. The 
variables and connections proposed by this model are the starting point for future 
research.
The model proposes that personality variables, justice variables, and attitudinal 
outcomes are all connected. The model proposes that the personality variables, belief in a 
just world, and negative affectivity have direct and indirect effects on employees’ 
attitudes. The perceived justice of the punishment event mediates the effect of 
personality variables. The procedural justice characteristics are perceptions of 
subordinate control, counseling, positive demeanor, arbitrariness, privacy, and 
explanations. The distributive justice characteristic was the harshness of the punishment. 
The model also shows that the distributive and procedural justice variables affect 
different attitudinal outcomes. Procedural characteristics would be a better predictor of 
attitudes about procedural fairness, trust in the supervisor, satisfaction with the 
supervisor, and organizational commitment, while the distributive characteristic 
harshness should be the best predictor o f distributive justice and intentions to leave. For 
the most part, the connections between predicted variables were supported. The 
implication of this study was that there are variables beyond consistency that affect the 
perceptions of punishment fairness. Additionally, this study provides evidence that fair 
punishments affect attitudinal outcomes like commitment, satisfaction and intentions to 
leave the company. One limitation of this model has been the fact that it does not take 
into consideration how fairness impacts the level of behavioral change that occurs with 
the punishment.
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Trevino and Weaver (1998) also believed that justice evaluations were extremely 
important to individuals’ reactions to punishment. The authors proposed five procedures 
that managers must follow in order for subordinates to perceive the punishment as fair. 
First, the severity of the punishment must match the severity of the behavior and make 
the punishment consistent with what others received. Second, the manager must provide 
subordinates with input into the punishment decision-making process. Third, the 
manager should use the punishment for constructive counseling and avoid negative 
emotional actions. Fourth, the manager should adequately explain the punishment in a 
way that ties it to the misconduct. Fifth, the punishment should be administered based on 
organizational rules. One of the procedural variables that was proposed by both Ball et 
al. (1993) and Trevino and Weaver (1998) was that explanations should accompany the 
punishment. Causal accounts have been proposed to be positively related to procedural 
justice evaluations of the punishment incident and therefore to increase the individual’s 
perceptions of fairness (Ball, Trevino, & Sims, 1992). Butterfield et al. (1996) found that 
managers do use explanations to try to manage the impressions o f punishment. Managers 
usually make self-serving explanations that often take the form of excuses, justifications, 
or apologies (Schlenker & Wiengold, 1992). Unfortunately, no research has been 
undertaken to examine which type of account will be most effective at reducing the 
negative reactions to punishment.
Implications for Punishment in Organizations
The preceding discussion of punishment and organizational justice has 
implications for how supervisors and managers administer punishment to their 
subordinates. Punishment usually brings about negative side effects, such as anger, 
avoidance, resentment and retaliation, in the punished individual. The negative side 
effects that accompany punishment are very similar to the reactions of individuals who
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receive unfair reward allocations. Managers must be aware of ways to punish 
undesirable behavior without inciting these negative reactions.
Studies of punishment and justice have shown that fair procedures can be used to 
decrease the negative reactions to punishment. The most often examined procedural 
variable has been consistency. Unfortunately, consistency cannot always be used by 
managers to influence the perceptions of punishment because of the dynamics of each 
punishment event. Therefore, the focus of this study will be on a variable that can be 
used during all punishment events regardless of the situation: social accounts. Social 
accounts have been extremely effective at reducing the negative reactions of individuals 
receiving damaging outcomes. Since individuals receiving negative punishment react 
similarly to individuals receiving negative reward allocation decisions, a social account 
should have a similar effect on a punished individual’s reactions. Managers do use social 
accounts to manage subordinates’ impressions of the punishment, but no one has 
examined which of the four types of accounts is most effective at reducing subordinates’ 
reactions.
The research problem of this thesis is: how can managers effectively use 
punishment to change undesirable behavior without the punished individual having 
negative side effects that result in detrimental effects on the organization?
This study has a threefold focus. First, at what level of punishment severity will 
undesirable behaviors be most effectively changed? Second, will social accounts 
increase the perceived fairness and increase individual’s attitudes towards the levels of 
punishment? Finally, will ideological accounts and causal accounts differ in their 
patterns of effectiveness for the different levels of punishment?
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Chapter 5 
Research Design and Hypotheses
The present study uses a 3 x 3 design. The first independent variable manipulated 
the severity of the punishment with three levels: low, medium, high; and the second 
independent variable manipulated the type of account that was given: ideological, causal, 
redundant account.
The majority of studies in the punishment literature have examined the most 
effective methods of changing behavior with punishment, while most of the literature 
joining justice and punishment have not included the effectiveness of behavioral change 
in their examination of perceived punishment fairness (Bennett, 1998, as the sole 
exception). Therefore, in concordance with the punishment literature, the first two 
hypotheses state the predicted conditions under which there will be the most behavioral 
change.
Hypothesis 1: The high level of punishment will result in greater performance 
compared to either low or moderate punishment.
Hypothesis 2: The punishment severity and social account type will interact to 
affect performance. Specifically, at the low level of punishment the presence of a social 
account will have no effect on performance, but at moderate and high levels of 
punishment the presence of an account will result in greater performance in comparison 
to a redundant account.
Bennett (1998) found that high levels of punishment decreased perceptions of 
fairness and increased negative attitudes (anger, dissatisfaction, retaliation). Hypothesis 
3 provides the same prediction for the current study.
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Hypothesis 3: There will be a main effect of punishment on punishment fairness, 
Interactional Justice, anger, retaliatory behavior, and dissatisfaction. Specifically, the 
high level of punishment will decrease the perceptions of punishment fairness and 
Interactional Justice and increase levels of anger, retaliatory behavior, and dissatisfaction 
compared to low or moderate punishment. Additionally, a moderate level of punishment 
will decrease the perceptions of punishment fairness and Interactional Justice and 
increase levels of anger, retaliatory behavior, and dissatisfaction compared to low 
punishment.
The benefits of social accounts on perceived fairness and reactions to negative 
outcomes have been found in many organizational settings, and there appears to be some 
benefit for them in punishment incidents. Ball et al. (1993) found that social accounts are 
effective at increasing perceptions of fairness during punishment, but to date, no study 
has experimentally examined the effects of social accounts in a punishment context.
Hypothesis 4: There will be a main effect of social account on punishment 
fairness, Interactional Justice, anger, retaliatory behavior, and dissatisfaction. Individuals 
receiving an account will have increased perceptions of punishment fairness and 
Interactional Justice and will show less anger, retaliatory behaviors, and dissatisfaction 
compared to individuals receiving a redundant account.
The group-value model states that procedures are important to individuals’ 
perceptions of fairness because they convey to the individual his/her status within the 
group. Therefore, fair procedures convey to the individual dignity and respect. 
Ideological accounts, in which the decision-maker takes responsibility, justifies the 
outcome, and appeals to a superordinate goal, should be perceived as fairer than causal 
accounts, in which the decision-maker does not take responsibility and blames the 
punishment on mitigating circumstances. The causal account should be seen as a less
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viable explanation for the punishment and, therefore, will be judged as less fair than the 
ideological account.
Outcome severity has been shown to moderate the effect of social accounts on 
fairness and attitudes. The level of the punishment severity should have an effect on 
perceptions of fairness, attitudes, and behaviors. Schlenker (1980) found the severity of 
the injustice was affected by the extent to which the behavior appeared to contradict an 
aspect of the individual’s social-identity. An ideological account takes into consideration 
the individual’s self-identity by explaining the reasons for the negative outcomes through 
the use of a superordinate goal and appeals to the individual’s values. The decision­
maker shows the individual dignity and respect by taking complete responsibility for and 
justifying the reasons for the negative outcomes the individual received. Since the 
ideological account helps to make sure that punishment does not contradict the 
individual’s self-identity, ideological accounts should help increase perceptions of 
fairness for all levels of punishment. Therefore, even high levels of punishment should 
be perceived as appropriate when ideological accounts are given. Individuals receiving 
an ideological account should perceive a high level of punishment fairer than an 
individual receiving a causal account or no account.
Causal accounts will have the greatest effect when the punishment’s severity is 
moderately strong. When the punishment is very weak, the social account should not 
have an effect because the mild nature of the punishment should not harm the individual 
to the point where an explanation is needed. Additionally, when the punishment is 
extremely severe, more than simply a causal account will be needed to change how the 
individual feels about the punishment event. Therefore, at a moderate level of 
punishment the individual should be most receptive to the causal account, and as a result, 
the causal account should be most effective at increasing perceptions of fairness and
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decreasing negative attitudes at moderate levels of punishment. Ideological and causal 
accounts will have different patterns depicting their moderating effects.
Hypothesis 5: There will be an interaction of punishment severity and social 
account. Specifically, at the high level of punishment, individuals receiving an 
ideological account will have greater perceptions of punishment fairness and Interactional 
Justice and will have less anger, retaliatory behaviors, and dissatisfaction compared to 
individuals receiving a causal account. Additionally, at the low level of punishment, no 
differences are predicted between any of the account conditions.
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Chapter 6 
Method
Participants
One hundred-ninety-five Midwestern university students participated voluntarily 
in the experiment. The sample consisted of 68% females and 32% males with gender 
distribution by condition ranging from 45% female to 85% female. The average age of 
the participants was 21 years old. Most of the participants were early in their college 
careers (32% freshman, 34% sophomores, 19% juniors, 14% seniors, and less than 1% 
classified themselves as either nondegree or graduates students). Seventy-three percent 
of the students were in majors outside of psychology. Participants were given extra 
credit points for participating in the study along with 20 opportunities to win a $150 gift 
certificate in a lottery.
Design
The experiment is a 3 x 3 between-subjects design. The independent variables 
include the level of punishment (low, moderate, and high) and the type of social account 
(ideological, causal and redundant account). The dependent variables include 
punishment fairness, Interactional Justice, satisfaction with the experimenter, anger, and 
intention to retaliate.
Measures
Manipulation checks. Numerous items were used to assess the impact of the 
independent variables and other experimental features. The impact of the independent 
variables was examined with two questions that assessed the punishment severity and two 
questions that assessed the social accounts. Punishment severity was examined with 
Questions 2 and 3 from Appendix C. The three bipolar items of Question 3 were 
aggregated to form a scale. Question 2 along with Question 7 and Question 8 that
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examines the effectiveness of the accounts were measured on a 7-point rating scale (1- 
strongly disagree to 7-strongly agree).
Other measures assessed the impact of certain experimental features such as the 
gift certificate value, the number of tickets participants received, and the understanding of 
the social accounts. (See Appendix B and C for the additional manipulation check 
items).
Attitudinal scales. Questionnaire B contained scales for fairness of punishment, 
Interactional Justice, satisfaction with the experimenter, and anger. Each item was rated 
on a 7-point scale. The punishment fairness scales contained five bipolar items that were 
aggregated to form a scale. The measure was adapted from Ball et al. (1993) (alpha =
.96). Four items measured Interactional Justice (items 9-13 in Appendix C). Three items 
measured satisfaction with the experiment (items 14-16 in Appendix C). Finally, four 
bipolar items measured the amount of anger the participants felt about the removal of 
tickets. These items were adapted from Bies et al (1988) (alpha = .92). The complete 
questionnaire is located in Appendix C.
Questionnaire C contained questions about participants’ intentions to retaliate 
against the experimenter. Participants were asked to evaluate the experiment for the 
Psychology Department. The Psychology Department evaluation questionnaire was 
developed to measure the retaliatory behavior the participants might show towards the 
experimenter for the punishment they received. The complete questionnaire is located in 
Appendix E.
Procedure
The experiment was run with 65 participants as an early pilot study to determine 
the effectiveness of the independent variables. Small changes were made to the 
independent variables to maximize their impact. First, it was determined that the no
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account condition had the same impact as the ideological and causal account conditions. 
Post-experiment interviews determined that participants used the instructions at the 
beginning of the experiment as their explanation for why they had tickets taken away, 
thus, their attitudes towards the punishment were at the same level as the individuals in 
the social account conditions. Two steps were taken to combat this problem. First, the 
opening instructions were made more general. Second, the participants in the no account 
condition received an explanation that was general and based on the instructions. By 
making the instructions more general, participants had less information to process the 
reasons for the punishment. The no account condition was now labeled the redundant 
account condition.
The appropriate number of tickets taken away for the three levels of punishment 
severity was also determined during the initial stage o f the experiment. It was important 
to find the number of tickets that would be perceived to be slightly, moderately and 
highly punishing. It was determined that 1 worked best for low, 5 for moderate, and 9 for 
high.
When the participants arrived at the laboratory, they were greeted and were seated 
around a large table. Groups of three to six participants participated in the experiment at 
the same time. First, the participants were invited to read and sign the consent form in 
Appendix G. Next, the experimental instructions were read out loud to the participants. 
The participants were told that they would complete two simple editing tasks. For each 
o f the editing tasks, the participants were required to circle the entire set o f upper case 
and lower case letter Ts that appeared in a story. The reward for circling 90% of the Ts 
that appear in each task would be 10 tickets for a lottery drawing for a $150 gift 
certificate that would occur at the end of the data collection. If the participant did not 
identify 90% of the Ts on each task, some o f their tickets would be taken away from the
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total number of tickets they received.
Participants were taken to isolated rooms where they found 10 lottery tickets 
placed on the desk with the first task. Task 1 was timed for 10 minutes, at which time the 
experimenter collected the task from each participant and pretended to grade it while the 
participants completed Questionnaire A. After approximately 10 minutes the 
experimenter returned to participants a sheet of paper explaining the level of punishment 
they received (the number of tickets removed) and an account explaining the reason for 
the level of punishment they received. Participants reviewed their score sheet and 
completed Questionnaire B.
The participants next completed Task 2. Before beginning the task, the 
experimenter reminded the participants that they still had an opportunity to obtain an 
additional 10 tickets if  they could perform well on the next task. After 10 minutes, the 
experimenter gathered the task and pretended to grade it while the participants completed 
the retaliation questionnaire.
After the participants completed all of the questionnaires, they were all brought 
back together into the large room and debriefed. All of the participants were given 20 
lottery tickets regardless of the punishment severity condition they were in along with 
their extra credit. After the collection of the experimental data, the $150 gift certificate 
was given to one research participant, and the remaining participants were notified that 
the prize was awarded.
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Chapter 7 
Results
This study examines how punishment levels and different types of social accounts 
affect people’s task performance and their attitudes. The performance-related dependent 
variable was measured by counting the number of upper- and lower-case Ts that were 
present in a short passage used on Task 1 and Task 2. The attitudinal dependent variables 
were the fairness of the punishment, the Interactional Justice, the punishment-induced 
anger, the satisfaction with the experiment, and the intention to retaliate against the 
experimenter.
The experimental results will be discussed below. The discussion will begin with 
a review o f the analysis of the manipulation checks. Next, the experimental analyses and 
evaluation of the hypotheses pertaining to the performance dependent variable will be 
discussed. Then, the experimental analyses and evaluation of the hypotheses pertaining 
to the attitudinal dependent variables will be examined. Finally, the results section will 
conclude with an exploratory analysis of the no account and redundant account 
conditions.
Manipulation Checks
Manipulation checks were used in this study to determine whether or not 
participants understood important aspects of the experiment, especially the experimental 
treatments. A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was use to analyze the 
punishment severity and adequacy of the social accounts. Other manipulation checks 
were analyzed in order to evaluate participants’ understanding of the experimental
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features. The other features included: (a) the gift certificate value; (b) the number of 
tickets they received; (c) the participants’ understanding of the social account.
Additional analyses were conducted to examine the Task 1 difficulty, and the analyses 
included: (a) the number of participants completing Task 1 and (b) and the number of 
individuals achieving 90% or more on Task 1. The results of the manipulation check 
analyses are discussed in the following sections.
Punishment severity. Either one, five or nine tickets from the participants’ 
original ten tickets were removed for not performing satisfactorily on Task 1. This 
removal of tickets manipulated the three levels of punishment severity. Participants who 
had more tickets removed from their original allotment of ten tickets, as a result of poor 
performance, should have perceived the ticket removal as more severe than participants 
who had fewer tickets removed.
The punishment severity was measured with two questions, Question 2 and 
Question 3, on Questionnaire B. Question 2 asked participants, “How much of a penalty 
did you feel ticket removal was?” A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 
performed using Question 2 as the dependent variable and punishment severity (low, 
moderate, and high) and social account type (ideological, causal, and redundant) as the 
independent variables. Table 1 displays the means of the experimental conditions, and 
Table 2 displays the ANOVA table for this analysis.
As expected, there was a significant main effect of punishment level. 
Unexpectedly, a significant main effect of social account type was revealed. Finally, a 
significant interaction between punishment level and social account type was found.
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Table 1
Punishment Severity Manipulation Check Means (02)
Account
Punishment Level
Type Low Moderate High Means
Ideological 1.45 3.60 4.95 3.33
Causal 1.30 3.20 4.70 3.07
Redundant 1.20 3.95 6.00 3.72
Means 1.32 3.58 5.22 3.37
Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where higher values indicate greater severity. Condition n = 20.
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Table 2
ANOVA of the Punishment Severity Manipulation Check ( 02 )
Source SS df F E n2
Punishment Level (P) 460.31 2 185.25 .001 .684
Account Type (A) 12.81 2 5.16 .007 .057
P x  A 12.49 4 2.51 .043 .056
Error 212.45 171
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Since the significant interaction takes precedence over the significant main effects, the 
interaction will be discussed in detail.
Simple effect analyses were performed to reveal the pattern of the interaction. 
Four significant simple effects were found. A significant simple main effect of 
punishment was found for each o f the three social account conditions at p<.001. A 
Tukey Honestly Significant Difference Test was used to further evaluate all significant 
simple main effects, and the alpha level was set at .05. The pattern of these simple main 
effects indicates that the low severity level was perceived to be less severe than the 
moderate or high punishment levels, and the moderate severity condition was perceived 
« to be less severe than the high punishment for each of the social account conditions. The 
pattern of means for these conditions can be found in Table 1. Finally, an unexpected 
simple effect of account type was found at the high punishment level, F(2,169)=7.57, 
p<.01. A post hoc analysis revealed that the redundant account (M=6.00) increased 
participants’ perceptions of punishment severity compared to the causal account 
(M=4.70) or the ideological account (M=4.95); the causal and ideological accounts did 
not differentially affect participants’ perceptions of punishment severity.
The results indicated that as the punishment level increased, participants’ 
perceptions of punishment severity increased for all account types. For the low or 
moderate punishment level, the account type did not influence participants’ perceptions 
of punishment severity, but at the high punishment level, providing an ideological or a 
causal account helped ease the negative effects of the high punishment compared to 
providing a redundant account.
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Question 3 on Questionnaire B asked participants to circle a value on three 
bipolar scales that illustrated their feelings about the penalty they received. The bipolar 
responses were aggregated into a scale and used in this analysis. A two-way analysis of 
variance was performed using Question 3 as the dependent variable and punishment 
severity and account types as the independent variables. Table 3 displays the means for 
the experimental conditions, and Table 4 displays the ANOVA table of the results.
As expected, there was a significant main effect of punishment level. A Tukey 
Honestly Significant Difference Test was used for all post hoc analyses, and the alpha 
level was set at .05. A post hoc analysis indicated that the punishment level participants 
received directly influenced their severity perceptions. Specifically, participants who 
received a low severity level (M-2.19) perceived the punishment to be less severe than 
participants receiving a moderate (M=3.63) or high punishment level (M=4.93), and 
participants receiving a moderate punishment perceived the punishment to be less severe 
than participants receiving a high punishment level. The results indicated that 
participants’ perceptions of punishment severity increased as the punishment level 
increased.
Questions 2 and 3 in Questionnaire B were used to evaluate participants’ 
perceptions of punishment severity. As expected, there was a significant correlation 
between the two questions, r=.81, p<.001 suggesting that the two questions were 
measuring a similar construct and presumably the construct was punishment severity 
perceptions. The analysis of the two punishment severity manipulation checks questions 
revealed that punishment level affected how participants perceived the punishment’s
Table 3
Punishment Severity Manipulation Check Means (03)
Account
Punishment Levei
Type Low Moderate High Means
Ideological 2.48 3.63 4.47 3.51
Causal 2.00 3.38 4.86 3.39
Redundant 2.08 3.87 5.42 3.79
Means 2.19 3.63 4.93 3.57
Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where higher values indicate greater severity. Condition n = 20, 
except the ideological high and causal high conditions, n = 19. Two participants were not 
included because o f incomplete survey data.
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Table 4
ANOVA of the Punishment Severity Manipulation Check (03)
Source SS df F E *1
Punishment Level (P) 219.76 2 89.72 .001 .515
Account Type (A) 4.38 2 2.19 ns —
P x  A 9.41 4 2.35 ns —
Error 206.99 169
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severity. Specifically, at the low punishment level, participants felt as though the 
punishment were mildly severe; at the moderate punishment level, participants felt as 
though the punishment were moderately severe; and at the high punishment level, the 
participants felt as though the punishment were strongly severe.
In summary, the expected main effect of punishment severity was found across 
the three social account types for both Question 2 and Question 3. As the punishment 
severity increased, participants’ perceptions of punishment severity also increased. One 
minor qualification to this main effect pattern occurred for Question 2. The analysis of 
the significant interaction revealed that in addition to the three significant severity simple 
effects, there was also one significant account simple effect. At the high punishment 
level, providing an ideological and causal account reduced participants’ perceptions of 
punishment severity more than providing a redundant account.
Account adequacy. The adequacy o f the three social accounts was evaluated with 
two questions, Question 7 and Question 8, from Questionnaire B. Question 7 asked the 
participants, “How adequate was the explanation provided on the Task 1 score sheet that 
describes why you had tickets taken away?” The intent of this question was to determine 
if  the participants felt that the explanation they received provided strong enough 
justification as to why they had the number o f tickets taken away that they did. It was 
predicted that participants who received an ideological account or a causal account would 
perceive the account to be more adequate than participants receiving a redundant account 
because an ideological and a causal account are more detailed and provide the 
participants with a plausible reason why they had tickets taken away.
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A two-way analysis of variance was performed using punishment level and 
account type as the independent variables and Question 7 as the dependent variable.
Table 5 displays the means for the experimental conditions, and Table 6 displays the 
ANOVA table for this analysis.
As expected, there was a significant main effect of account type. A Tukey 
Honestly Significant Difference Test was used for all post hoc analyses, and the alpha 
level was set at .05. A post hoc analysis indicated that participants perceived the 
ideological account (M=4.58) and causal account (M=4.20) to be significantly more 
adequate than the redundant account (M=3.19). There was no significant difference 
between the ideological and causal accounts. Unexpectedly, there was also a significant 
main effect of punishment level. The follow-up post hoc analysis indicates that 
participants receiving a low punishment level (M=4.83) perceived the account they 
received to be more adequate than participants receiving a moderate (M=3.68) or high 
punishment level (M=3.48). There was no significant difference between the moderate or 
high punishment levels. The interaction of punishment level and account type was not 
significant.
These results indicate that the ideological and causal accounts were effective.
Both the ideological and causal accounts were perceived to be significantly more 
adequate than the redundant account. The unexpected significant main effect of 
punishment severity suggested that each account type was perceived to be more adequate 
when they received a weak punishment compared to when they received a moderate or 
high punishment.
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Table 5
Social Account Manipulation Check Means (07)
Account
Punishment Level
Type Low Moderate High Means
Ideological 5.80 3.65 4.30 4.58
Causal 4.53 4.15 3.95 4.20
Redundant 4.15 3.21 2.20 3.19
Means 4.83 3.68 3.48 3.99
Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where higher values indicate greater adequacy. Condition n = 20, 
except the causal low and redundant moderate conditions, n = 19. Two participants were 
not included because of incomplete survey data.
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Table 6
ANOVA of the Social Account Manipulation Check ( 07 )
Source df F E
Punishment Level (P) 62.59 2 8.60 .001 .092
Account Type (A) 61.97 2 8.51 .001 .092
P x  A 26.29 4 1.81 ns —
Error 615.10 169
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Question 8 asked the participants, “How sufficient was the explanation provided 
on the Task 1 score sheet that describes why you had tickets taken away?” The intent of 
this question was to determine if the participants felt that the explanation they received 
provided enough information as to why they had the number of tickets taken away that 
they did. It was predicted that the ideological account and the causal account would be 
perceived to be more sufficient than the redundant account since these two accounts are 
more detailed and provide the participants with a significant amount of information why 
they had tickets taken away.
A two-way analysis of variance was performed using Question 8 as the dependent 
variable and punishment level and account type as the independent variables. Table 7 
displays the means for the experimental conditions, and Table 8 displays the ANOVA 
table for this analysis.
As predicted, there was a significant main effect of account type. A Tukey 
Honestly Significant Difference Test was used for all post hoc analyses, and the alpha 
level was set at .05. The follow-up post hoc analysis showed that participants perceived 
the ideological account (M=4.63) and causal account (M=4.30) to be significantly more 
sufficient than the redundant account (M=2.95). There was no significant difference 
between the ideological and causal accounts. Unexpectedly, there was also a significant 
main effect of punishment level. A post hoc analysis indicates that participants receiving 
a low punishment level (M=4.62) perceived the account they received to be more 
sufficient than participants receiving a moderate (M=3.77) or high punishment level
62
Table 7
Social Account Manipulation Check Means f08)
Account
Punishment Level
Type Low Moderate High Means
Ideological 5.75 4.20 3.95 4.63
Causal 4.45 4.30 4.15 4.30
Redundant 3.65 2.80 2.40 2.95
Means 4.62 3.77 3.50 3.96
Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where higher values indicate greater sufficiency. Condition n = 20.
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Table 8
ANOVA of the Social Account Manipulation Check (08)
Source SS df F E Tl2
Punishment Level (P) 40.81 2 5.63 .004 .062
Account Type (A) 95.34 2 13.15 .001 .133
P x  A 14.42 4 .99 ns —
Error 620.15 171
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(M=3.50). There was no significant difference between the moderate or high punishment 
levels. Additionally, the interaction of punishment level and account type was not 
significant. Both the ideological and causal accounts were perceived to be significantly 
more sufficient than the redundant account. Finally, since there was no significant 
difference between the ideological and causal accounts, the results indicated that 
participants felt as though these two accounts provided a similar level of detail in the 
explanations. The unexpected significant main effect of punishment severity revealed 
that the perceived sufficiency of the explanation was significantly higher when the 
punishment was weak compared to when it was moderate or high The account 
sufficiency o f all three accounts decreased as the punishment became more severe.
Questions 7 and 8 on Questionnaire B were used to measure how effectively each 
social account was in explaining why the participants had their specific number of tickets 
taken away. The results indicated that participants perceived the ideological and causal 
accounts both to be more adequate and more sufficient than the redundant account. The 
unanticipated main effect of punishment severity for adequacy and sufficiency indicated 
that the punishment level affected participants’ perceptions of the social account, such 
that a weak punishment resulted in significantly more adequate accounts than did a 
moderate or high punishment. Since Question 7 and Question 8 were used to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the social accounts in explaining why the participant had tickets taken 
away, it was predicted that the two items would be highly correlated. Question 7 and 
Question 8 were significantly correlated, r=76, p<.001. Participants who perceived the 
social account as adequate also perceived the social account to be sufficient.
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Overall, the analyses for Question 7 and Question 8 produced the same pattern of 
results. Ultimately, the results indicate that ideological and causal accounts provided the 
participants a better justification for why they received the punishment. Despite the fact 
that ideological and causal accounts were perceived to be more adequate and sufficient 
than the redundant account, the overall results indicate that the mean adequacy and 
sufficiency ratings for the ideological and causal accounts were smaller than expected. 
The small mean ratings o f adequacy and sufficiency could have resulted from poorly 
designed social accounts.
Other manipulation checks. Other manipulation check questions were asked in 
Questionnaire A and Questionnaire B. These manipulation checks were intended to 
examine participants’ understanding of the information provided in the experiment. 
Additional manipulations checks were conducted to evaluate participants’ performance 
on Task 1.
Question 5 on Questionnaire A asked the participants, “What was the value of the 
gift certificate you could receive?” The intent of this question was to determine if the 
participants knew the value o f the gift certificate that was being given away as a prize by 
the experimenter. Since the amount of the gift certificate could potentially impact the 
participants’ perceptions of the punishment severity, it is important to know if the 
participants were aware of the gift certificate amount. Incorrect answers could indicate 
that participants did not pay close attention to the experimenter’s instructions. Ninety- 
eight percent o f the participants (177 out o f 180) were aware of the gift certificate 
amount.
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Question 1 on Questionnaire B asked the participants to identify the number of 
tickets they received for completing Task 1. The intent of this question was to determine 
how conscientiously the participants read the Task 1 Score Sheet. An incorrect response 
would indicate that the participant did not thoroughly read the Task 1 Score Sheet. 
Ninety-nine percent of the participants (178 out of 180) correctly identified the number of 
tickets they received on Task 1.
Question 4 asked the participants, “Who was responsible for taking away the 
tickets for Task 1?” Participants were to circle either the response choice “Experimenter” 
or the response choice “Thesis Committee.” The intent of this item was to determine if 
the participants in the ideological and causal account conditions understood who was 
responsible for deciding how many tickets the participants would have taken away. In 
the ideological account, participants were told that the experimenter had taken away 
tickets to help motivate the participants to increase their performance on Task 2. In the 
causal account, the participants were told that the experimenter’s thesis committee 
determined the level of punishment that they would receive and the experimenter was not 
involved in the decision. Seventy percent of the participants (42 out of 60) receiving an 
ideological account indicated that the experimenter was the individual who was 
responsible for taking away Task 1 tickets. Ninety-five percent of the participants (57 
out of 60) receiving a causal account indicated that the thesis committee was responsible 
for taking away Task 1 tickets. These results indicate that the majority of participants did 
thoroughly read and understand who was responsible for taking away tickets in the 
ideological and causal accounts.
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The final two manipulation checks evaluated participants’ performance on Task 1. 
In this experiment, one of the goals was to examine how punishment level and account 
type would affect participants’ performance from Task 1 to Task 2. One of the greatest 
challenges of this study was to determine the appropriate length of Task 1. Task 1 
needed to be long enough that participants would fall just short o f finishing but not be so 
long that the participants would not come close to finishing. If Task 1 were too short and 
many o f the participants completed the task within the allotted 10 minutes, a ceiling 
would be placed on participants’ performance resulting in an unrepresentative measure of 
Task 1 performance. If the task was too long, and the participants only finished a small 
portion of the task, they would not feel unfairly treated when tickets were taken away 
because internally they knew they deserved the outcome.
The first evaluation of the participants’ performance on Task 1 was the number of 
participants who finished the task. Twenty-seven of the 180 (15%) participants finished 
Task 1. Finishing Task 1 was defined as any participant who circled the last “t”. This 
measure was an indication of a potential ceiling effect because participants who finished 
the task could only increase their performance by going back through the task and finding 
any “ts” they missed. Therefore, completing Task 1 was not a measure of the number of 
“ts” circled in Task 1. These 27 participants may or may not have performed well on 
Task 1.
The second evaluation of participants’ performance on Task 1, the number of “ts” 
circled, was performed to determine the number of participants who performed extremely 
well on the task. Excellent performance was defined as participants who circled 90% or
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more of the “ts” in Task 1. Ninety percent was used as the standard of excellence 
because that was the value participants in the ideological and causal accounts were told 
they needed to achieve. Twenty out of the 180 (11%) o f the participants were able to 
circle 90% or more of the “ts” in Task 1. The pattern o f results from participants’ Task 1 
performance indicated that relatively few participants were able to complete Task 1 and 
even fewer were able to circle 90% or more of the “ts”. Theses results indicate that there 
was not a ceiling on participants’ Task 1 performance.
In summary, the manipulations appeared to work as intended, and participants 
seemed to understand the experimental information given to them throughout the 
experiment. The analysis of the punishment severity confirmed that participants 
receiving higher punishment levels perceived the punishment as more severe. The 
analysis of the social account adequacy confirmed that participants in the ideological and 
causal accounts perceived the explanation for ticket removal as more adequate and more 
sufficient than participants in the redundant account. Additionally, participants were 
aware of both the number of tickets they had taken away from them and the value of gift 
certificate. The causal account results indicate that participants understood that the 
experimenter’s thesis committee was responsible for removing the participant’s tickets. 
The ideological account results indicate that participants understood that the experimenter 
was responsible for removing the participant’s tickets. Finally, there did not appear to be 
a ceiling on participants’ performance on Task 1 that might have resulted from too short a 
task.
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Dependent Variables
This experiment proposed that the punishment level and social account type 
would affect both the participants’ performance and the participants’ attitudes towards 
the punishment and experiment. Performance was measured by counting the number of 
upper- and lower-case “ts” correctly circled in Task 2 and controlling for the number of 
“ts” circled in Task 1. The participants’ attitudes towards the punishment level and 
social account type were measured with five dependent variables: fairness of the 
punishment, Interactional Justice, satisfaction with the experiment, anger produced as a 
result o f the punishment, and intention to retaliate against the experimenter.
Performance measure. Performance was measured by counting the number of 
upper- and lower-case “ts” correctly circled in Task 2 and controlling for the number of 
correctly circled “ts” in Task 1. The intent of the performance measure was to evaluate 
how the participants’ performance on Task 2 changed from Task 1 after they received the 
independent variable manipulations. Therefore, evaluating Task 2 after controlling for 
the performance on Task 1 would provide evidence as to the effect of the independent 
variables on Task 2 performance beyond the performance on Task 1.
A two-way analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was conducted to evaluate the 
effects of punishment level and social account type on participants’ performance on Task 
2. Task 1 was appropriate to use as the covariate in the ANCOVA because it was 
administered before the application of the independent variable manipulations, and 
because Task 1 and Task 2 are significantly correlated, r=. 71, p<.001. After the removal 
of one univariate outlier on Task 1, homogeneity of regression was achieved, F(8,
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178)=1.76, p=.09. The mean number of “ts” circled on Task 1 and Task 2 is displayed in 
Table 9 and Table 10, respectively. The mean number of “ts” circled on Task 2 adjusted 
for the covariate, Task 1, is displayed in Table 11. Finally, the ANCOVA table is located 
in Table 12.
The ANCOVA analysis reveals that the main effect of punishment level was not 
significant. Interestingly, the main effect of account type was significant. Finally, the 
interaction o f punishment level and account type was not significant. The results indicate 
that Task 2 performance after controlling for Task 1 performance was not affected either 
by the punishment level or by the interaction of punishment level and social account type, 
but that the account type received affected performance. Two hypotheses were proposed 
to explain the effect of punishment level and social account type on the performance 
dependent variable. The a priori contrasts used to evaluate the two hypotheses are 
discussed below.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that the high punishment level would result in greater 
performance compared to either low or moderate punishment. The contrast between the 
high punishment condition and the moderate and low punishment conditions was not 
significant, t(170) = 1.512, p>.10 . Specifically, participants receiving the high 
punishment condition (M=347.98) did not perform better on Task 2 than did participants 
receiving the moderate and low punishment conditions (M=349.78). As a result, 
Hypothesis 1 is not supported.
Hypothesis 2 predicted that the punishment level and social account type would 
interact to affect performance. Specifically, at the low punishment level the presence of a
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Table 9
Mean Number of “Ts” Circled on Task 1
Account
Punishment Level
Type Low Moderate High Means
Ideological 304.10 297.84 264.70 288.88
Causal 287.55 304.75 290.75 294.35
Redundant 305.60 291.00 304.95 300.52
Means 299.08 297.86 286.80 294.58
Note. Condition n = 20, except the ideological moderate condition n=19. One case was
removed because o f an outlier on Task 1.
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Table 10
Mean Number of “Ts” Circled on Task 2
Account
Punishment Level
Type Low Moderate High Means
Ideological 353.65 362.37 333.30 349.74
Causal 351.75 363.25 342.30 352.43
Redundant 341.10 337.30 349.05 342.48
Means 348.83 354.31 341.55 348.23
Note. Condition n = 20, except the ideological moderate condition, n=19. One case was
removed because of an outlier on Task 1.
73
Table 11
Adjusted Mean Number of “Ts” Circled on Task 2
Account
Punishment Level
Type Low Moderate High Means
Ideological 345.75 359.65 358.03 354.48
Causal 357.56 354.81 345.46 352.61
Redundant 331.96 340.25 340.45 337.55
Means 345.09 351.57 347.98 348.22
Note. Condition n = 20, except the ideological moderate condition, n=19. One case was
removed because of an outlier on Task 1.
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Table 12
ANCOVA of the Performance on Task 2
Source SS df F p
Task 1 Performance 290534.37 1 216.73 .001 .562
Punishment Level (P) 704.40 2 .46 ns —
Account Type (A) 9009.61 2 3.72 .026 .042
P x  A 26.29 4 .65 ns —
Error 232055.18 170
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social account would have no effect on performance, but at moderate and high levels of 
punishment the presence of an account would result in greater performance in 
comparison to a redundant account. At the low punishment level, the contrast between 
the average of the ideological and causal account and the redundant account was not 
significant, t(170) = 1.01, p>.10. Participants who received an ideological or causal 
account (M=351.66) did not perform better on Task 2 than participants receiving a 
redundant account (M=331.96) in the low punishment condition. At the moderate 
punishment level, the contrast between the average of the ideological and causal account 
and the redundant account was significant, t(170) = 2.22, p=.03. Participants who 
received an ideological or causal account (M=357.16) did perform better on Task 2 than 
participants receiving a redundant account (M=340.50) in the moderate punishment 
condition. At the high punishment level, the contrast between the ideological and causal 
account and the redundant account was not significant, t(170) = 1.00, p>.10. Participants 
who received an ideological or causal account (M=351.75) did not perform better on 
Task 2 than participants receiving a redundant account (M=340.45) in the high 
punishment condition. Hypothesis 2 was partially supported.
Attitudinal Measures
Scale formation. Participants completed two questionnaires that contained the 
dependent variable scales. Questionnaire B contained the measures of fairness of the 
punishment, Interactional Justice, satisfaction with the experiment, and anger due to the 
punishment. The Psychology Department Survey contained the intention to retaliate 
measure.
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An analysis of internal consistency was performed on each variable’s items before 
developing the dependent variable scales. The internal reliability for each dependent 
variable’s items was evaluated by Cronbach’s Alpha, and the reliabilities were presented 
in Table 13. All of the dependent variable scales except the satisfaction scale possessed 
the reliability of at least .70 that Nunnally (1994) suggested to be an adequate internal 
consistency for evaluating group data. After the removal of item 15 from Questionnaire 
B, the reliability of the satisfaction scale increased to near the .70 level. Following the 
internal consistency analysis, the items comprising each scale were aggregated to form a 
composite scale measuring each dependent variable. The composite scores were used in 
all subsequent analyses.
Attitudinal analyses. The analysis of the attitudinal dependent variables will 
begin with a discussion of the results of the multivariate analysis of variance and each 
dependent variable’s univariate analysis of variance. The attitudinal analysis section will 
conclude with a review of the remaining experimental hypotheses and a review of their 
specific a priori contrasts.
The omnibus F tests for the multivariate and univariate analysis of variance were 
provided to illustrate the overall effect of the two independent variables on the five 
attitudinal dependent variables. No follow-up post hoc analyses were performed to 
evaluate significant main effects or interactions. Instead, the anticipated effects of 
punishment level and social account level, predicted in Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5, were 
examined with a priori contrasts and will be discussed after the presentation of the 
omnibus F tests.
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Table 13
Intercorrelations and Cronbach’s Alpha for Attitudinal Scales
Scale 1 2 3 4 5
1. Fairness .93
2. Interactional Justice -.26 .88
3. Satisfaction -.41 .73 .69
4. Anger -.75 .31 .44 .91
5. Retaliation -.26 .35 .39 .39 .78
Note. All correlation coefficients are significant, p<.01 
Cronbach’s Alpha for each scale is shown on the diagonal.
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A two-way multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed using 
the five attitudinal variables (fairness of punishment, Interactional Fairness, satisfaction 
with the experiment, anger due to the punishment, and intention to retaliate) as the 
dependent variables and the punishment level and social account type as the independent 
variables. The MANOVA table is displayed in Table 14.
The main effect of punishment level was significant. The main effect of account 
type was not significant, but as Table 14 shows, was nearly significant (p=.057). Finally, 
the interaction of punishment level and account type was not significant. The results 
reveal that across the five dependent variables, the punishment level has a significant 
effect on participants’ attitudes towards the punishment, the experimenter, and the 
experiment.
Five two-way analyses of variance (ANOVA) were performed using punishment 
fairness, Interactional Justice, satisfaction, anger, and retaliation as the dependent 
variables, and the punishment level and social account type as the independent variables 
for the five dependent variables. Condition means are displayed in Tables 15, 17, 19, 21, 
23, respectively, and their ANOVA summaries table in Tables 16, 18, 20, 22, 24, 
respectively.
A significant main effect of punishment was found for the punishment fairness, 
satisfaction with the experiment, anger, and retaliation toward the experimenter, and there 
was a nearly significant main effect for Interactional Justice (Table 18). A significant 
main effect of social account type was found for Interactional Justice and satisfaction
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Table 14
MANOVA of the Five Attitudinal Variables
Source F E
1
*1
Punishment Level (P) 10 18.84 .001 .360
Account Type (A) 10 1.82 .057 —
P x A 20 .64 ns —
Error 334
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Table 15
Punishment Fairness Scale Means
Account
Punishment Level
Type Low Moderate High Means
Ideological 1.37 3.01 4.13 2.84
Causal 1.87 3.25 4.36 3.16
Redundant 1.22 3.16 4.61 3.00
Means 1.49 3.14 4.37 2.99
Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where 1 is Fair and 7 is Unfair. Condition n = 20.
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Table 16
ANOVA of the Punishment Fairness Scale
Source SS F E
2
11
Punishment Level (P) 250.65 2 95.51 .001 .528
Account Type (A) 3.14 2 1.20 ns —
P x  A 4.39 4 .84 ns —
Error 224.38 171
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Table 17
Interactional Justice Scale Means
Account
Punishment Level
Type Low Moderate High Means
Ideological 6.88 6.46 6.22 6.45
Causal 6.43 5.94 6.10 6.16
Redundant 6.00 5.73 5.35 5.70
Means 6.38 6.04 5.89 6.10
Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where higher values indicate greater perceptions of Interactional 
Justice. Condition n = 20.
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Table 18
ANOVA of the Interactional Justice Scale
Source SS df F 2 'H2
Punishment Level (P) 7.43 2 2.89 .058 —
Account Type (A) 17.28 2 6.73 .002 .073
P x  A 1.70 4 .43 ns —
Error 219.71 171
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Table 19
Satisfaction Scale Means
Account
Punishment Level
Type Low Moderate High Means
Ideological 6.78 6.65 6.10 6.51
Causal 6.48 6.32 6.18 6.33
Redundant 6.33 5.95 5.35 5.88
Means 6.53 6.31 5.88 6.24
Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where higher values indicate greater satisfaction. Condition n = 20, 
except the causal moderate condition, n=19. One participant was not included because of 
incomplete survey data.
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Table 20
ANOVA of the Satisfaction Scale
Source SS df E E ■n
Punishment Level (P) 13.14 2 5.94 .003 .065
Account Type (A) 12.74 2 5.75 .004 .063
P x  A 2.59 4 .58 ns —
Error 189.24 170
86
Table 21
Anger Scale Means
Account
Punishment Level
Type Low Moderate High Means
Ideological 6.44 4.94 4.10 5.16
Causal 6.21 4.83 4.28 5.10
Redundant 6.43 4.45 3.64 4.84
Means 6.36 4.74 4.00 5.03
Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where higher values indicate less anger. Condition n = 20.
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Table 22
ANOVA of the Anger Scale
Source SS df E E
2
Punishment Level (P) 174.14 2 69.35 .001 .448
Account Type (A) 3.54 2 1.41 ns —
P x  A 4.05 4 .81 ns —
Error 214.70 171
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Table 23
Retaliation Scale Means
Account
Punishment Level
Type Low Moderate High Means
Ideological 4.62 4.55 4.23 4.47
Causal 4.58 4.55 4.20 4.44
Redundant 4.65 4.20 4.23 4.36
Means 4.62 4.43 4.22 4.42
Note. Scale is 1 to 7 where higher values indicate less retaliation. Condition n = 20.
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Table 24
ANOVA of the Retaliation Scale
Source SS df F E o 2
Punishment Level (P) 4.68 2 7.34 .001 .079
Account Type (A) .37 2 .58 ns —
P x  A 1.32 4 1.04 ns —
Error 54.48 171
90
with the experiment. No significant punishment severity by social account type 
interactions were found for any of the attitudinal dependent variables.
Attitudinal hypotheses. Hypothesis 3 predicted that there would be a main effect 
of punishment on punishment fairness, Interactional Justice, anger, retaliatory behavior, 
and dissatisfaction. Specifically, the high level of punishment would decrease the 
perceptions of punishment fairness and Interactional Justice while increasing levels of 
anger, retaliatory behavior, and dissatisfaction compared to low or moderate punishment. 
Additionally, a moderate level of punishment would decrease the perceptions of 
punishment fairness and Interactional Justice while increasing levels of anger, retaliatory 
behavior, and dissatisfaction compared to low punishment.
Two planned contrasts were used to evaluate Hypothesis 3. First, the high 
punishment level was contrasted with the low and moderate punishment levels for each 
attitudinal dependent variable. Second, the moderate punishment level was contrasted 
with the low punishment level for each attitudinal dependent variable. Means for the five 
dependent variables are displayed in Tables 15, 17, 19, 21, 23.
The first planned comparison was significant for punishment fairness 
(t(171)=l 1.34, p<.001), satisfaction with the experiment (t(170)=3.32, p<.001), anger 
(t(171)=8.71, p<.001), and intention to retaliate (t(171)=3.39, p<.001) but was not 
significant for Interactional Justice (t(171)=1.79, p=.076). The second planned 
comparison was significant for punishment fairness (t(171)=7.91, p<.001), satisfaction 
with the experiment (t(170)=2.20, p=.03), and anger (t(171)=7.92, p<.001) but not 
significant for either Interactional Justice (t(171)=1.61, p>.10) or intention to retaliate
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(t(l 71)=1.78, £=.077). Hypothesis 3 was fully supported for the dependent variables 
fairness of punishment, satisfaction with the experiment, and anger about the punishment; 
partially supported for the dependent variable intention to retaliate; and not supported for 
interpersonal treatment. The results reveal that the high punishment level produced less 
fairness, less satisfaction, greater anger, and greater intentions to retaliate than did either 
the moderate or the low punishment levels. In addition, the moderate punishment level 
produced less fairness, less satisfaction, and greater anger than did the low punishment 
level. Finally, none of the three punishment levels significantly affected participants’ 
perceptions o f interpersonal treatment.
Hypothesis 4 predicted that there would be a main effect of social account on 
punishment fairness, Interactional Justice, anger, retaliatory behavior, and dissatisfaction. 
Individuals who received an account would have increased perceptions of punishment 
fairness and Interactional Justice and would show less anger, retaliatory behaviors, and 
dissatisfaction in comparison to individuals who received no social account. One 
planned contrast was used to evaluate Hypothesis 4. Specifically, the ideological and 
causal accounts were combined and contrasted with the redundant account for each 
attitudinal dependent variable.
The planned comparison was significant for Interactional Justice (t(171)=3.38, 
p<.001) and satisfaction with the experiment (t(171)=4.96, £<.001), but was not 
significant for punishment fairness (t(171)=.01, p>.10), anger (t(171)=1.66, £>.10) or 
intentions to retaliate (t(171)=1.06, £>.10). Thus, Hypothesis 4 was supported for two of 
the five attitudinal dependent variables. Receiving a thorough explanation (ideological or
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causal accounts) for why the participant had lottery tickets taken away resulted in greater 
perceptions of interpersonal treatment and greater satisfaction than did receiving a 
superficial explanation (a redundant account). However, the type of account did not 
affect participants’ perceptions of punishment fairness, anger, or their intentions to 
retaliate.
One important facet of this study was examining how ideological and causal 
accounts differentially impact peoples’ attitudes towards a negative outcome. Fair 
procedures convey dignity and respect to the individual. It is expected that an 
explanation that provides an individual dignity and respect in the face of a negative 
outcome will be the most effective at maintaining positive attitudes. A decision-maker 
who provides an ideological account takes responsibility for the outcome, justifies the 
outcome, and appeals to a superordinate goal. On the other hand, a decision-maker who 
provides a causal account does not take responsibility for the outcome and blames the 
negative outcome on mitigating circumstances. The ideological account, which focuses 
the explanation on how the negative outcome can help the employee through a 
superordinate goal, should be more effective at alleviating the negative impact of harmful 
outcome. Hypothesis 5 predicts a differential effect of ideological and causal accounts at 
the high severity level.
Three planned contrasts were used to evaluate Hypothesis 5. Specifically, the 
first contrast examined the differential effect of the ideological and causal accounts for 
each attitudinal dependent variable at the high punishment level. The other two contrasts 
examined the differential effects of the social accounts at the low punishment level for
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each dependent variable. The second contrast specifically examined the average effect of 
the ideological and causal accounts compared to the redundant account for each 
attitudinal dependent variable at the low punishment level. The final contrast examined 
the effect of the ideological account to the causal account at the low punishment level for 
each dependent variable.
The first contrast examines the prediction that at the high punishment level, 
individuals who received an ideological account would perceive punishment as fairer, 
would be more satisfied, would perceive the interpersonal treatment as more fair, would 
be less angry, and would be less likely to retaliate. This contrast between the ideological 
and causal accounts at the high punishment level was not significant for punishment 
fairness (t(171)=.64, p>.10), Interactional Justice (t(171)=.74, p>.10), satisfaction with 
the experiment (t(170)= 19, p>.10), anger (t(171)= 49, p>.10) or intention to retaliate 
(t(171)= 19, p>.10). Means are displayed in Tables 15, 17, 19, 21, and 23. The 
ideological account was unable to lessen the negative impact of the high punishment for 
any of the five attitudinal variables compared to the causal account.
The other two contrasts examine in tandem the null hypothesis that the three 
social account types will have the same effect on the five attitudinal variables at the low 
severity level. In other words, at the low punishment level, an account is not needed, and 
a weak explanation will have the same effect as a thorough one.
This pair of contrasts was evaluated for all five attitudinal variables. The first 
planned contrast was significant for satisfaction with the experiment (t(170)=2.43, p= 02) 
but was not significant for punishment fairness (t(l 71)=1.28, p>.10), Interactional Justice
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(t(171)=1.72, p=. 09), anger (t(171)=.33, p>.10), and intentions to retaliate, (t(171)= 32, 
£>.10). The second planned contrast was not significant for any of the attitudinal 
dependent variables; specifically, punishment fairness (t(l71)=1.38, p>.10), Interactional 
Justice (t(171)= 70, p>.10), satisfaction with the experimenter (t(171)= 66, p>.10), anger 
(t(171)=.64, p>.10), and intentions to retaliate (t(171)= 187, p>.10). Thus, the second 
part of Hypothesis 5 was supported for four of the five dependent variables. At the low 
punishment level, the type o f account the participant received did not affect perceptions 
of punishment fairness, Interactional Justice, anger, or intentions to retaliate. In contrast 
to Hypothesis 5, receiving an ideological or causal account increased perceptions of 
satisfaction at the low punishment level.
In summary, Hypothesis 5 was partially supported for four of the five dependent 
variables. The results of the first contrast revealed that at the high punishment level the 
ideological account was not found to affect differentially any o f the five dependent 
variables. This indicated that the two social accounts had equivalent impact on the five 
dependent variables, and these results do not support Hypothesis 5. The other two 
contrasts examined if  any of the account types would significantly affect the five 
dependent variables at the low punishment level. Receiving a thorough account (an 
ideological or causal account) at the low punishment level did not impact participants’ 
perceptions o f punishment fairness, Interactional Justice, anger, or intentions to retaliate 
compared to receiving a superficial account (a redundant account) supporting Hypothesis 
5. However, in contrast to the predictions o f Hypothesis 5, participants were more 
satisfied when a thorough account was given compared to a superficial one at the low
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punishment level. The pattern of results revealed that giving an individual an ideological 
account provided no added benefit compared to giving a causal account. Additionally, 
the results indicate that each of the accounts has the same effect on individuals’ attitudes 
when given a weak punishment, although one must be cautious when support has been 
given to a predicted null hypothesis such as that proposed in the second half of 
Hypothesis 5.
Exploratory analysis. This study proposed that social accounts would help relieve 
the negative effects produced by administering high levels of punishment. Therefore, a 
condition in which no account was given would be predicted to produce less punishment 
fairness, satisfaction, and Interactional Justice, and would produce increased anger and 
intention to retaliate than a condition in which an account was given. Unfortunately, the 
results of the first pilot study indicated that participants in the no account condition were 
unaware that they did not receive an account and interpreted some of the information 
given in the beginning instructions as an adequate explanation for why they had tickets 
removed. In an attempt to alleviate this problem, the experimenter altered the 
instructions to the beginning of the experiment so that participants could not misconstrue 
why they had tickets removed. Additionally, instead of giving the participants no 
explanation for the ticket removal, they were given a short, vague, and superficial 
explanation that provided participants only with redundant information.
In order to determine if having absolutely no account would produce a different 
result for the five dependent variables, an exploratory analysis was performed. Fifteen 
additional subjects were run through the experiment. These fifteen participants received
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the high punishment level and the no account condition. The participants were only run 
through this condition because it was predicted that a difference between the redundant 
account and no account would be best identified at the high punishment level.
The exploratory analysis was conducted for the five attitudinal dependent 
variables. The redundant account (M=4.61) did not produce greater perceptions of 
fairness than the no account (M~5.17), t(l 85)—1.50, p>. 10. The redundant account 
(M=5.35) did not produce greater feelings of Interactional Justice than the no account 
(M=5.70), t(184)=.94, p>.10. The redundant account (M=5.35) did not produce greater 
feelings of satisfaction than the no account (M=5.87), t(l 85)=1.21, p>. 10. The redundant 
account (M=3.64) did not incite less anger than the no account (M=3.20), t(185)=.64, 
p>.10. Finally, the redundant account (M=4.23) did not incite the participants to retaliate 
more than the no account (M=4.35), t(185)=1.45, p>.10. The results revealed that 
providing the participants a short, superficial, and redundant account held the same 
effectiveness at mitigating the negative effects of the high punishment level as not 
providing an account, thus, indicating that the administration of a weak explanation had 
the same impact as giving no explanation at all.
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Chapter 8 
Discussion
Despite the call from researchers to eliminate punishment because of its negative 
impact on workers, punishment has a long-standing place in organizations (Butterfield, 
Trevino, & Ball, 1996). Even with the negativity associated with organizational 
discipline, management continues to use punishment as a way to change ineffective 
behavior when positive reinforcement is not possible. The effectiveness of punishment 
may depend on the level of punishment given and how the punishment is justified.
Employees will not react to all punishments exactly the same. The severity of the 
punishment and the adequacy of the explanation will affect both the amount of behavior 
change and employees’ resulting attitudes about the punishment, the administering 
manager, and the organization. The manager who must give an employee a punishment 
holds the tricky task of administering the appropriate level of punishment to change the 
unwanted behavior without inciting negative feelings in the employee.
Researchers have repeatedly examined how the level of punishment affects 
punishment effectiveness, but little consensus has been reached as to the most appropriate 
level. In behavioral terms, punishment is an aversive stimulus that is intended to 
decrease the likelihood of an unwanted outcome (Lutz, 1994). The goal of punishment, 
then, is to remove the unwanted behavior and to bring the employee into accordance with 
the organizations’ expectations. Unfortunately, determining the appropriate punishment 
is often difficult, and inappropriate punishments can be costly to the organization.
One effect an inappropriate punishment might have is not changing behavior.
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Punishments that are very lenient may not be strong enough to change employee 
behaviors. If the punishment is too strong, the individual may be too strongly impacted 
by the punishment, leaving the individual angry, frustrated, and unmotivated to perform 
his/her job.
Individuals who are treated fairly during negative organizational outcomes 
(selection decisions, layoffs, and pay reductions) tend to view the outcome as fair. One 
way to treat an employee fairly during a punishment incident is to provide him/her with a 
thorough explanation of the reasons the punishment was given. In general, people want 
to know the reasons why things happen to them, and punishment incidents are no 
different. Individuals who receive an explanation in conjunction with a negative 
outcome perceive the negative outcome as more fair compared to individuals who do not 
receive an explanation (Bies & Shapiro, 1987). Thorough explanations will work to 
build trust between the supervisor and employee, which will then produce positive 
attitudes in the employee despite the negative outcome.
Decision-makers are faced with a dilemma: Do I give an employee a strong 
punishment, which will result in behavior change but may result in the employee forming 
negative attitudes? Or, do I give an employee a weak punishment, resulting in both little 
behavior change and few negative attitudes? Based on the synthesis of previous research, 
it was hypothesized that a manager can get substantial behavior change without 
jeopardizing employees’ positive attitudes with the use of social accounts.
The aim of this study was to examine how punishment severity and different 
types of social accounts would work to impact performance and attitudes. Specifically, it
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was hypothesized that strong punishments would result in the greatest change in 
performance. Additionally, it was proposed that the stronger punishments would have a 
more negative impact on employee attitudes, and thorough explanations would have a 
more positive effect on attitudes than a weak account. Finally, it was hypothesized that 
the ideological account would have a more positive impact on attitudes at the strong 
punishment level than either the causal account or the redundant account. The following 
sections review the results of the manipulation checks and dependent variables and the 
implications of these results. The chapter will conclude with an examination of the 
limitations of this study and areas for future research.
Manipulation Checks
The participant’s perceptions of the severity of punishment were assessed with 
two questions. As expected, the results revealed that participants’ perceptions of 
punishment severity increased as the number of tickets that were taken away increased. 
Unexpectedly, the results from Question 2 in Questionnaire B revealed a significant 
interaction, such that the punishment severity was perceived to be less severe when either 
an ideological or causal account was given. The inconsistency in finding a significant 
interaction for one of the two items measuring the perceptions of punishment severity 
was not anticipated. The two items were highly correlated, but the questions may not 
have been perceived the same way due to their different rating scales. Unfortunately, it is 
unknown exactly what aspect of the two questions produced the unexpected results.
The effectiveness of the social accounts was assessed with two questions 
examining account adequacy and sufficiency. As expected, the participants viewed the
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ideological and causal accounts as more adequate and sufficient than the redundant 
account. Therefore, explanations that gave a thorough justification as to why someone 
received a punishment were viewed more favorably than explanations that provided a 
weak justification. Additionally, punishment severity had a strong impact on the 
perceived adequacy and sufficiency of the social accounts. Specifically, if  a weak 
punishment were given, accounts were considered more adequate and sufficient than they 
were at either the moderate or high punishment levels.
One caveat should be made about these social account results, even though the 
results were generally in the expected direction. The mean perception o f adequacy and 
sufficiency was quite low. At the moderate and high punishment levels, the adequacy 
and sufficiency ratings were not much higher than four on a 7-point scale for either the 
ideological or causal accounts.
The weak effect of the social accounts could have been due to multiple reasons. 
First, the content of the ideological and causal accounts may not have been strong enough 
explanations to justify why the participant had tickets taken away. Therefore, the current 
accounts were not strong enough to counteract the negative effects of the moderate and 
high severity level. Second the nonverbal medium used to present the social accounts 
may have limited their effectiveness. Shapiro et al. (1994) found that causal accounts 
were perceived to be more adequate when the explanation was presented verbally rather 
than in a written format. Presenting the explanations verbally may have helped 
strengthen the impact of the justification. Finally, these social accounts may have 
reached their maximum possible effectiveness and little could be done improve their
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impact. It is possible that peoples’ attitudes during punishment events are driven by the 
punishment outcome, and social accounts may have little impact on reducing negative 
attitudes. Social accounts may not be the answer to solving the punishment paradox.
Finally, many items were used to evaluate participants’ understanding of the 
features of the experiment. The possibility that participants did not understand key parts 
of the experiment could indicate that unintended stimuli affected the participants’ 
reactions in the study. With very few exceptions, participants understood the features of 
the experiment. Participants’ understanding of both the value of the gift certificate and 
the number of tickets they received should have impacted participants’ perceptions of the 
punishment severity. Only three and two people incorrectly identified the gift certificate 
value and number of tickets received, respectively.
A difficult aspect of this study was developing Task 1 so that the length was short 
enough that participants would almost finish but not so long that the participants would 
not come close to finishing. Pilot research found that participants who did not come 
close to finishing Task 1 did not perceive any of the three punishment levels to be 
punishing because they felt their performance was undeserving o f a reward. On the other 
hand, when participants completed the task circling the majority of the “ts”, they 
possessed a heightened perception of unfairness as a result of punishment. The number 
o f participants finishing Task 1 and the number of people achieving 90% accuracy was 
used to evaluate the appropriateness of Task 1 ’s length. The number of participants 
completing Task 1 and achieving the 90% accuracy was small enough to assume that no 
ceiling was placed on the amount of performance change produced from Task 1 to Task2.
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Test of Hypotheses
This study used a 3x3 between-subjects design to examine the effect of 
punishment severity and account type on five attitudinal dependent variables and one 
performance dependent variable. The five attitudinal dependent variables were fairness 
of the punishment, Interactional Justice, satisfaction with the experiment, anger, intention 
to retaliate, and performance. Planned contrasts were used to evaluate the five 
hypotheses of the study.
Hypothesis 1 and 2 examined the effective of punishment severity and the 
interaction of punishment severity and social accounts on Task 2 performance after 
accounting for Task 1 performance. Before examining the planned comparisons, an 
ANCOVA was performed to gain a broad understanding of the results. The main effect 
of punishment severity and the interaction of punishment severity and account type were 
not significant. Unexpectedly, a main effect of account type did emerge. Providing an 
individual with a thorough explanation for his/her punishment may actually help increase 
performance.
The planned comparisons of Hypothesis 1 indicate that punishment severity had 
no significant effect on Task 2 performance after controlling for Task 1 performance. 
These results do not support Bennett’s (1998) results showing that the greatest increase in 
performance occurs with stronger punishments. Intuitively, there is reason to believe that 
participants’ lack of motivation to perform on the Task 2 affected these results. This 
study assumes that participants were motivated to win the $150 gift certificate. The distal 
motivation produced by a gift certificate given away two to six months after participants
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completed the experiment may have not been enough incentive to perform well on Task 
2. Additionally, the participants did not know about the $150 prize gift certificate before 
they signed up for the experiment; therefore, the gift certificate may have been seen as a 
bonus if participants won but may not have been a true motivator. Even though these 
issues of motivation seem relevant to this outcome, there is no evidence that participants 
were not motivated to perform on Task 2. In fact, participants performed proportionally 
better on Task 2 then they did on Task 1. Participants on average circled 294.58 out of 
the 422 “t”s (70%) on Task 1 while participants circled 348.23 out of 460 “t”s (76%) on 
Task 2. Undoubtedly, the increase in performance is affected in some capacity by a 
practice effect, but there is no indication that participants were not motivated to perform 
on Task 2.
Hypothesis 2 predicted an interaction of punishment severity and account type on 
Task 2 performance after accounting for Task 1 performance, which has never been 
examined in a punishment context. The results revealed that at the low punishment level, 
none of the social accounts affected performance; at the moderate punishment level, the 
ideological and causal accounts produced a greater performance increase over Task 1 
than the redundant account; and at the high punishment level, the type of account 
received had no effect on performance. Receiving a thorough explanation and a moderate 
punishment produced the greatest amount of performance after accounting for Task 1. 
Interestingly, as Table 11 indicates, providing a social account produced greater 
performance on Task 2 after accounting for Task 1 than providing a redundant account
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across all punishment levels. Providing a thorough explanation for a negative outcome 
may benefit performance regardless of the outcome severity.
Next, the effect of punishment severity and account type was examined on the 
five attitudinal dependent variables. In order to form a broad understanding of the impact 
of punishment severity and account type on the five attitudinal variables, one multivariate 
analysis of variance using all five attitudinal dependent variables and five separate 
univariate analysis of variance tests were conducted. The MANOVA results revealed a 
significant main effect of punishment severity and a near significant main effect of 
account type. The univariate analyses revealed a significant main effect of punishment 
for punishment fairness, satisfaction with the experiment, anger, and intentions to 
retaliate and a near significant main effect for Interactional Justice. A significant main 
effect of social account type was found for Interactional Justice and satisfaction with the 
experiment. No significant punishment severity by social account type interactions was 
found for any of the attitudinal dependent variables. Planned comparisons developed in 
Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5 were used to further evaluate the effects of punishment severity 
and account type on the five attitudinal dependent variables.
Previous research has shown that negative outcomes can have a detrimental effect 
on peoples’ attitudes, such as perceptions of fairness (Adams, 1963, Brockner & 
Wiesenfelt, 1996), Interactional Justice (Bies & Moag, 1986), satisfaction (Folger & 
Konovsky 1989, Greenberg, 1990a), anger (Kemper, 1966), and intentions to retaliate 
(Kemper, 1966). This study attempted to support previous research by examining how 
different levels of punishment affect peoples’ attitudes in Hypothesis 3.
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Hypothesis 3 predicted a main effect of punishment severity on fairness of 
punishment, Interactional Justice, satisfaction with the experimenter, anger, and intention 
to retaliate. The results indicated that as the punishment increases, punishment fairness 
decreases, satisfaction with the experiment decreases, and anger increases. Participants’ 
willingness to retaliate only increased at the highest punishment level, which indicates 
that acts of retaliation may only occur when punishment outcomes are strong. Finally, 
Interactional Justice was not affected by any of the punishment levels. Interactional 
Justice examines the interpersonal treatment an individual receives, and therefore, the 
level o f the punishment may not have affected how participants viewed their 
interpersonal treatment. In general, these results support the previous research findings 
and extend them to the context o f punishment.
Hypothesis 4 tested the main effect of account type on the five attitudinal 
variables. The results partially support the previous research that indicates that social 
accounts can reduce the negative impact of negative outcomes (Bies, 1986). The results 
revealed that providing a thorough explanation increased participants’ feelings of 
interpersonal fairness and satisfaction with the experiment. These results extend previous 
research findings revealing that explanations increase peoples’ perceptions of 
Interactional Justice to disciplinary situations. Building trust through interpersonal 
relations can be very important in the workplace, and by providing thorough explanations 
during the punishment, the manager may be able to keep the interpersonal relationship 
intact in the face of the disciplinary decision by using a social account.
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Unexpectedly, the main effects of account type on punishment fairness, anger, 
and intentions to retaliate were not significant. These results indicate that the punishment 
severity may have been more important in determining these attitudes than social 
accounts. It is somewhat unexpected that these attitudes were not impacted by the 
thorough explanations. Based on previous research findings, one would suspect that a 
thorough explanation would decrease the perceived punishment severity and thereby 
increase punishment fairness, decrease anger, and decrease intentions to retaliate.
Hypothesis 5 predicted an interaction between punishment severity and account 
type; specifically, the ideological account would be more effective at reducing the 
negative impact of the high punishment level. The results for the five attitudinal 
dependent variables were not significant. Support for previous research that has shown 
ideological accounts to be more effective than causal accounts was not obtained (Bobocel 
& Farrell, 1996). The two accounts had the equivalent impact on the participants’ 
attitudes. Based on the results testing Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 5, it appears that 
more research needs to be undertaken to determine when explanations will be most 
effective in a punishment context. The results did reveal that, as predicted, account type 
did not effect participants’ perceptions of punishment fairness, Interactional Justice, 
anger, or intentions to retaliate at the low punishment level. It is realized by the author 
that this hypothesis predicted the acceptance of the null hypothesis, and one should not 
over interpret this result because it is unknown whether or not the result is due to the 
experimental manipulations or due to measurement error, bias, or power issues. It is 
possible to fail to reject the null for reasons other than the experimental manipulations.
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One exploratory analysis was conducted to examine how the no account condition 
compared to the redundant account condition. Early in the experiment implementation, it 
was discovered that participants who received no account explaining the punishment used 
information provided in the instructions to interpret the punishment fairness. As a result, 
the experiment had to be redesigned so that participants could not use the information 
provided in the introductions. Specifically, two changes were made: (a) the instructions 
were made more general and (b) the participants were given a very short, vague, and 
redundant (information they already knew) explanation rather than receiving no 
information about the punishment.
Fifteen participants received the no account, high punishment condition to 
determine how the no account condition would compare to the redundant account 
condition now that the instructions were general. Subjects were only run through the 
high punishment severity condition because the biggest difference between the two 
conditions should occur there. No differences were found between the two conditions. 
Disciplinarians appear to be no better off providing a weak explanation than if they had 
given no account at all.
Implication of Findings
By performing a laboratory experiment, the experimenter has been able to control 
for many extraneous variables that occur in organizational contexts. Therefore, one of 
the benefits of this research is that it examined the effects of punishment severity and 
account type without the influence of any other organizational influences, such as 
politics, subordinate-supervisor relationship, previous behavior, or previous punishments.
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Additionally, the adequate sample size, random assignment to conditions, and a sampling 
of both males and females should allow for some generalization of results.
This study has many implications for individuals in power positions who 
administer punishments. This study has shown that the level o f punishment may not be 
the most important influence on peoples’ performance change. In fact, it was found that 
the three levels of punishment did not differ in their levels of performance. The impetus 
for the increased performance was the interaction of social accounts and punishment 
level. Only when a thorough social account explaining why the punishment was given 
along with a moderate punishment was Task 2 performance significantly large.
This was a very interesting finding because it implies that managers may not need 
to provide strong punishments to effect performance as previous researchers have 
indicated (Bennett, 1998). Not having to provide people with strong punishments will 
allow disciplinarians to improve performance without producing strong negative attitudes 
towards him/her or the organization. This study determined that perceptions of 
punishment fairness and satisfaction were lowest and anger and intentions to retaliate 
were highest at the high punishment severity level. As a result, employees who do not 
receive strong punishments will have better perceptions of their managers and 
organization.
One way to decrease the negative impact o f punishment is to provide social 
accounts explaining in detail why the individual received the punishment. Managers who 
provide a thorough explanation are working proactively to reduce the negative impact of 
the punishment. This study found that thorough explanations did increase Interactional
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Justice and satisfaction with the experiment compared to the redundant account 
condition. Interestingly, the type of account given may not differentially impact peoples’ 
attitudes. It was predicted that an ideological account would display greater dignity and 
respect to the recipient of the punishment than the causal account because the ideological 
account frames the discipline in terms o f a superordinate goal. Managers can use either 
ideological or causal accounts so long as the punished individual perceives the account as 
adequate.
Limitations
Before starting the experiment, all precautions were taken to ensure all 
methodological concerns were dealt with before implementing the study. Unfortunately, 
methodological issues arose during the study that could have caused the non-significant 
results found in this study.
First, the current study was a laboratory experiment. The results of this study may 
not generalize to organizational settings because many aspects of this study were not 
relevant to employees working in the “real world.” The effects of discipline in 
organizational settings can be affected by many organizational and interpersonal 
relationship factors that this study did not take into consideration. The discipline that 
occurred in this study was between two individuals, the experimenter and the participant, 
who had never met before. In organizational settings, punishment occurs between two 
individuals, the subordinate and the manager, who have some type o f relationship. This 
relationship can impact, either positively or negatively, the result o f the punishment.
Other factors such as the organizations’ climate for discipline, employees’ feelings about
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the manager or organization, the procedures used to determine the punishment, and how 
the problem behavior was investigated will impact how employees will view the 
punishment incident.
Second, the method used to motivate participants to perform in this study was not 
equivalent to how people are motivated to perform in the workplace. In this study, 
participants could gain lottery tickets for a $150 gift certificate that would be given away 
to one of the participants after all the data had been collected. This distal reinforcer 
appears to be motivating to some participants because performance on Task 2 was 
proportionally better than the performance on Task 1. In the work place, managers often 
hold many immediate reinforcers, such as pay or promotions that if removed would be 
extremely motivating to an employee. Even though mildly reinforcing, this $150 gift 
certificate may have not been strong enough to produce the motivation needed to truly 
impact performance. It would be extremely interesting to see how different 
organizational punishers affect employee performance.
Third, the tasks of this study provided many problems. The first problem with the 
two tasks was the lack of control on how people performed on Task 1. Performance on 
Task 1 ranged from very well to very poor. As would be expected, how you performed 
on Task 1 may affect how you viewed the punishment. As a result there was more 
variability in the punishment severity perceptions than was expected.
The second problem with the tasks was the length of the tasks. As stated above, 
the variability of scores on Task 1 made it difficult to develop Task 1 so that it was long 
enough for the good performers and not too long for the poor performers. Many trials
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were taken to find the optimal length, and even then some participants finished the task. 
Task 2 was longer than Task 1 to reduce the ceiling effect produced by excellent 
performers. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the longer Task 2 may have actually 
motivated poor performers to reduce their effort level on Task 2 because they were 
unable to finish the shorter Task 1. Some poor performers believed that they were 
definitely not going to finish the longer Task 2 regardless of their effort. Even though 
Task 2 performance was proportionally better than Task 1, the difference between the 
two performance levels could have been greater if  it was possible to make the tasks 
equivalent. Due to the variability of Task 1 performance, there was little that could be 
done to make the task lengths any more similar.
The third problem with the tasks was that they were completely based on effort. 
Participants circled upper and lower-case “ts” in the two tasks. No skill or training was 
needed to perform these tasks. It is uncertain how punishment would affect performance 
on other tasks that required more technical skill or cognitive ability.
The fourth problem with the tasks was the possibility o f a practice effect. Any 
time people are measured more than once with similar measures, there is the possibility 
that people will perform better on the second measure because they use information they 
learned on the previous measures. In this case, participants may have performed better 
on Task 2 because of the practice they had on Task 1. The experimenter attempted to 
control the practice effects by using a completely different passage to circle “ts” for Task 
2, and an ANCOVA was used to analyze the data so that performance on Task 1 could be 
controlled.
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Future Research
The results of this study provide some support for the importance o f punishment 
severity and social accounts in changing unwanted behaviors and maintaining peoples’ 
positive attitudes. Despite the significant findings, this study has produced many more 
questions than it has answered. This section highlights the many areas o f future research 
that this study has stimulated.
First, future studies should examine punishment incidents in applied settings. 
Other studies have examined employee attitudes after punishment incidents in 
organizational settings, but no studies have examined the most effective punishments that 
will produce behavior change (Ball, Trevino, Sims, 1993; Trevino & Weaver, 1998). 
Understanding how to decrease the negative attitudes accompanying punishment is an 
important and noble goal, but researchers first need to gain a better understanding of the 
most effective ways to change behavior.
This study specifically examined one of the many procedural methods to reduce 
the negative impact of punishment. Providing explanations was found to increase 
Interactional Justice and satisfaction. Additional research should examine how other 
procedural justice components -  such as employee participation in the punishment, 
punishment consistency, non-biased decision-making, and a match between the 
punishment and behavior -  impact peoples’ attitudes after the punishment incident.
Based on research by Leventhal (1980), it is expected that all o f these features should 
have some effect on the perceived punishment fairness.
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The punishment in this study attempted to change participants’ performance on a 
simple, uncomplicated task. Punishment is used in situations other than those that 
attempt to change performance. Robinson and Greenberg (1998) defined six different 
types of antisocial behavior, including (a) workplace deviance; (b) antisocial behavior;
(c) employee vice; (d) organizational misbehavior; (e) workplace aggression; and (f) non- 
compliant behavior. Future research should examine the punishment intensity and 
implementation method that is most effective at changing unwanted behaviors other than 
poor performance.
In this study all the participants were set up to receive a punishment regardless of 
their performance. In organizations, hopefully this would not be the case. Managers 
should work hard to help their employees succeed. Organizations provide employee 
training, provide goal setting and feedback, and assist troubled employees with employee 
assistance programs as ways to fix behavior before punishment is necessary. During 
these interventions, performance and behavior expectations are usually directly or 
indirectly disclosed to the employee. Future research should examine how people 
perceive the punishment fairness when clear, specific performance expectations are set 
and when they are not.
Finally, more research needs to examine how and when social accounts will have 
the greatest ability to diminish the negative effect of punishment. The mean adequacies 
for both social accounts were much lower than expected, especially in the moderate and 
low punishment levels. Bies, Shapiro, and Cummings (1988) explain that all claims of 
mitigating circumstances are not the same. This suggests that some explanations are
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better than others. In this study, it appears that one account will not work in all 
situations. With a strong punishment, a new explanation is needed that provides a better 
and more thorough justification. Future research should examine what types and levels 
o f thoroughness work best at different levels of punishment.
Additionally, an account’s effectiveness may be linked to the interpersonal nature 
in which it is presented to its audience. In this study, each participant was given a sheet 
of paper with the punishment explanation. The experimenter participated in no verbal 
conversation with the participants, and participants were not allowed to ask questions 
about punishment outcome. Thus, in this situation, the personalness of the social accounts 
was very low. Future research should examine how the social account’s content and the 
perceived personalness of the account’s presentation interact to reduce the effect of 
negative outcomes.
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Appendix A
Subject Number
Task: #1
Instructions: You will be given an editing-type task. For this task you must 
circle all of the upper and lower case letter Ts (all “t”s and “T”s) that are found in 
the passage. You will receive 10 lottery tickets for performing satisfactorily on 
this task. Your performance will be measured as the number of Ts you circle 
minus any circling errors (e.g. circling the incorrect letter). Therefore, it is to 
your advantage to work as quickly and accurately as you possibly can. You will 
be given 10 minutes to complete the task. A short practice passage has been 
provided to let you practice performing the task before beginning the first real 
task.
Practice Passage 
Circle all of the Ts that appear in this passage.
When I wrote the following pages, or rather the bulk of them, I lived 
alone, in the woods, a mile from any neighbor, in a house which I built myself, on 
the shore of Walden Pond, in Concord, Massachusetts, and earned my living by 
the labor of my hands only. I lived there for two years and two months. At 
present I am a sojourner in civilized life again.
Turn to the next page for the correctly circled Ts.
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Practice Passage
When I wrote the following pages, or rather the bulk of them, I li ved 
alone, in the woods, a mile from any neighbor, in a house which I built myself, on 
the shore of Walden Pond, in Concord, Massachusetts, and earned my living by 
the labor of my hands only. I lived there for two years and two months. At 
present I am a sojourner in civilized life again.
To achieve 100% accuracy on this task, you should have correctly circled 17 Ts (5 in line 
one, 2 in line two, 3 in line three, 6 in line four, and 1 in line five).
You will be given 10 minutes to perform this task. After 10 minutes, the experimenter 
will ask you to please STOP working at which time please put down your pencils and 
wait for further instructions.
If you have any questions about performing the task, please ask the experimenter at this 
time.
Do Not Turn the Page Until Instructed to Do So!
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Circle all upper and lower case Ts found in the Passage.
I was bom in the year 1632, in the city of York, of a good family, though not of 
that country, my father being a foreigner of Bremen, who settled first at Hull: he got a 
good estate by merchandise, and, leaving off his trade, lived afterwards in York, from 
whence he had married my mother, whose relations were named Robinson, a very good 
family in that country, and from whom I was called Robinson Kreutzaer; but, by the 
usual corruption of words in England, we are now called, nay, we call ourselves, and 
write our name Crusoe, and so my companions always called me.
I had two elder brothers, one of which was lieutenant-colonel to an English 
regiment of foot in Flanders, formerly commanded by the famous Colonel Lockhart, and 
was killed in battle near Dunkirk against the Spaniards: what became of my second 
brother I never knew, any more than my father or mother did know what was become of 
me.
Being the third of three sons of the family, and not bred to any trade, my head 
began to be filled very early with rambling thoughts. My father, who was very ancient, 
had given me a competent share of learning, as far as house education and a country free 
school generally goes, and designed me for the law; but I would be satisfied with nothing 
but going to sea, and my inclination to this led me so strongly against the will, nay, the 
command of my father, and against all the entreaties and persuasions of my mother and 
other friends, that there seemed to be something fatal in that propension of nature tending 
directly to the life of misery which was to befall me.
My father, a wise and grave man, gave me serious and excellent counsel against 
what he foresaw was my design. He called me one morning into his chamber, where he 
was confined by the gout, and expostulated very warmly with me upon the subject. He 
asked me what reasons more than the mere wandering inclination I had for leaving my 
father’s house and my native country, where I might be introduced, and had a prospect of 
raising my fortune by application and industry, with a life of ease and pleasure. He told 
me it was for men of desperate fortunes on one hand, or of aspiring, superior fortunes on 
the other, who went abroad upon adventures, to rise by enterprise, and make themselves
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famous in undertakings of a nature out of the common road; that these things were all 
either too far above me, or too far below me; that mine was the middle state, or what 
might be called the upper station of low life, which he had found by long experience was 
the best state in the world, the most suited to human happiness, not exposed to the 
miseries and hardships, the labor and sufferings of the mechanic part of mankind, and not 
embarrassed with the pride, luxury, ambition, and envy of the upper part of mankind. He 
told me I might judge of the happiness of this state by this one thing-namely, that this was 
the state of life which all other people envied; that kings have frequently lamented the 
miserable consequences of being bom to great things, and wish they had been placed in 
the middle of the two extremes, - between the mean and the great; that the wise man gave 
his testimony to this as the just standard of tme felicity, when he prayed to have neither 
property nor riches.
He bid me observe it, and I should always find, that the calamities of life were 
shared among the upper and lower part of mankind; but that the middle station had the 
fewer disasters, and was not exposed to so many vicissitudes as the higher or lower part 
of mankind; nay, they were not subjected to so many distempers and uneasiness either of 
body or mind, as those were who, by vicious living, luxury, and extravagances on one 
hand, or by hard labor, what of necessaries and means or insufficient diet on the other 
hand, bring distempers upon themselves by the natural consequences of their way of 
living; that the middle station of life was calculated for all kind of virtues and all kind of 
enjoyments; that peace and plenty were the handmaids of the middle fortune; that 
temperance, moderation, quietness, health, society, all agreeable diversions, and all 
desirable pleasure, were the blessings attending the middle station of life; that this way 
men went silently and smoothly through the world, and comfortably out of it, not 
embarrassed with the labors of the hands or o f the head, not sold to the life of slavery for 
daily bread, or harassed with perplexed circumstances, which rob the soul of peace and 
the body of rest; not engaged with the passion of envy, or secret burning lust of ambition 
for great things; but in easy circumstances sliding gently through the world, and sensibly
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tasting the sweets o f living, without the bitter; feeling that they are happy, and learning 
by every day’s experience to know it more sensibly.
After this, he pressed me earnestly, and in the most affectionate manner, not to 
play the young man, not to precipitate myself into miseries which nature and the station 
of life I was bom in seemed to have provided against; that I was under no necessity of 
seeking my bread; that he would do well for me and endeavor to enter me fairly into the 
station of life which he had been just recommending me; and that if  I was not very happy 
in the world, it must be my mere fare or fault that must hinder it.
Appendix B
Subject Number:
Questionnaire A
Instructions:
While the research assistant is grading your task, please answer these 
questions. Please read each of the following questions carefully and answer the 
questions in the format provided. After finishing the questionnaire please put the 
questionnaire back into the folder and wait for the research assistant to give you 
further instructions.
All answers that you provide in the questionnaire will be kept strictly confidential.
Thank you very much for your assistance!
Please fill out the following information. Thank you.
1. Sex: (Check one)
Male _____
Female _____
2. Age (fill in years)_____________
3. Year in School (check one)
freshman _____
sophomore _____
junior _____
senior_______ _____
nondegree _____
graduate _____
4. Major: (fill in) ______________________
Please Turn to the Next Page.
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Please Fill Out the Following Information. Thank You.
5. What dollar amount is the gift certificate that you have a chance to win in the lottery? 
(fill in the exact value) $____________
6. What percentage of the Ts did you need to circle on Task 1 to be awarded all 10 
lottery tickets?
(fill in the percentage)_______ %
7. Did you complete all five pages of the task?
(Check one)  Yes  No
Please Turn to the Next Page
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8. What prior experience have you had with editing tasks, either in research settings or in 
school (proof reading papers, etc.)? Describe three such experiences.
9. Please explain the strategies you use to effectively perform these editing tasks.
10. What prior work experiences have you had with simple tasks (e.g. filing, data entry, 
etc.)?
11. Please explain the strategies you used to most efficiently perform these tasks.
12. If you had to teach someone else how to perform Task 1 what steps would you tell 
them to follow?
Please place the questionnaire back into the folder, and wait for the research 
assistant to give further instructions. Thank you for your assistance.
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Appendix C
Subject Number:
Questionnaire B
Instructions: Please fill out the questionnaire in the format provided. If you have any 
questions about the number of tickets you received for Task 1, please look back at the 
scoring sheet given to you by the experimenter. After finishing the questionnaire, please 
place the questionnaire back in the envelope and wait for instructions from the 
experimenter. PLEASE READ EACH QUESTION CAREFULLY AND ANSWER 
HONESTLY!!!!
1. How many tickets did you earn on Task 1 ? (please enter the number) ________
2. If you earned fewer than 10 tickets for Task 1, how much o f a penalty did you feel this 
was (circle one value) (If your received all 10 tickets circle N/A)?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 N/A
Slight Moderate Strong Severe
3. (If you received fewer then 10 tickets, please complete question #3. If  you received 
all 10 tickets for task 1 please skip question #3 and continue on to question #4.)
I feel that the penalty I received for Task 1 was:
(circle one value for each scale a., b., and c.)
a. Mild 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Severe
b. Lenient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Extreme
c. Inadequate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Excessive
4. The experimenter was responsible for the decision to take away lottery tickets for not 
reaching the 90% accuracy score.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Strongly Neither agree Strongly
Disagree nor disagree Agree
5. Who was responsible for the decision to remove lottery tickets (Circle one).
The Experimenter The Thesis Committee
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6. How do you feel about the number of tickets you received? 
It was (circle one value for each scale a., b., c., d., and e.):
a. Fair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unfair
b. Improper 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Proper
c. Just 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Injust
d. Unreasonable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Reasonable
e. Warranted 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unwarranted
7. How adequate was the explanation provided on the Task 1 Score Sheet that describes 
why you had tickets taken away (the punishment).
1 2 
Extremely 
Inadequate
3 4 5
Neither Adequate 
nor Inadequate
6 7
Extremely
Adequate
8. How sufficient was the explanation provided on the Task 1 Score Sheet that describes 
why you had tickets taken away (the punishment).
1 2 
Extremely 
Insufficient
3 4 5
Neither sufficient 
nor Insufficient
6 7
Extremely
Sufficient
9. The experimenter has dealt with me in a truthful manner.
1
Strongly
Disagree
3 4 5
Neither agree 
nor disagree
10. The experimenter has treated me with dignity and respect.
1
Strongly
Disagree
3 4 5
Neither agree 
nor disagree
11. The experimenter has been polite.
1
Strongly
3 4 5
Neither agree
7
Strongly
Agree
7
Strongly
Agree
7
Strongly
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Disagree nor disagree
12. The experimenter has treated me with kindness.
1
Strongly
Disagree
13. The experimenter has been open and honest with me.
Neither agree 
nor
1
Strongly
Disagree
Neither agree 
nor disagree
Agree
7
Strongly
Agree
7
Strongly
Agree
14. I am satisfied with the way the experimenter has conducted the experiment so far.
1
Strongly
Disagree
Neither agree 
nor disagree
7
Strongly
Agree
15. I am satisfied with the explanation for why I received the number of tickets I did.
1
Strongly
Disagree
Neither agree 
nor disagree
7
Strongly
Agree
16. I am satisfied with how the experimenter has treated me during the experiment.
1
Strongly
Disagree
Neither agree 
nor disagree
7
Strongly
Agree
17. How do you feel about the number of tickets you received for Task 1 ?
I feel (circle one value for each scale a., b., c., and d.):
a. Angry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Happy
b. Resentful 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Unresentful
c. Outraged 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Satisfied
d. Upset 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Calm
Please place the questionnaire back into yellow folder upon completion. Thank you!
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Appendix D
Subject Number
Task: #2
Instructions: You will be given an editing-type task. For this task you must 
circle all of the upper and lower case letter Ts (all “t”s and “T”s) that are found in 
the passage. You will receive 10 lottery tickets for performing satisfactorily on 
this task. Your performance is measured as the number of Ts you circle minus 
any circling errors (e.g. circling the incorrect letter). Therefore, it is to your 
advantage to work as quickly and accurately as you possibly can. You will be 
given 10 minutes to complete the task.
You will be given 10 minutes to perform this task. After 10 minutes, the 
experimenter will ask you to please STOP working at which time please put down 
your pencils and wait for further instructions.
Do Not Turn the Page Until Instructed to Do So!
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Circle all of the upper and lower case Ts in the Passage.
I never traveled in this journey above two miles outright in a day, or thereabouts. 
But I took so may turns and returns to see what discoveries I could make that I came 
weary enough to the place where I resolved to sit down for all night; and then I either 
reposed myself in a tree, or surrounded myself with a row of stakes set upright in the 
ground, either from one tree or another, or so as no wild creature could come at me 
without waking me.
As soon as I came to the seashore I was surprised to see that I had taken up my lot 
on the worst side o f the island; for here, indeed, the shore was covered with innumerable 
turtles, whereas on the other side I had found but three in a year and a half. Here was 
also an infinite number of fowls of many kinds; some which I had seen, and some which I 
had not seen before- and many of them very good meat- but such as I knew not the names 
of, except those called penguins.
I could have shot as many as I pleased, but was very sparing o f my powder and 
shot, and therefore had more mind to kill a she-goat if  I could, which I could better feed 
on; and though there were many goats here- more than on my side of the island- yet it 
was with much more difficulty that I could come near them, the country being flat and 
even, and they saw me much sooner than when I was on the hill.
I confess this side of the country was much pleasanter than mine; but yet I had not 
the least inclination to remove, for as I was fixed in my habitation it became natural to 
me, and I seemed all the while I was here to be as it were upon a journey, and from home. 
However, I traveled along the shore of the sea towards the east, I suppose about twelve 
miles; and then, setting up a great pole upon the shore for a mark, I concluded I would go 
home again, and that the next journey I took should be on the other side of the island east 
from my dwelling, and so round till I came to my post again: of which in its place.
I took another way to come back than that I went, thinking I could easily keep all 
the island so much in my view that I could not miss finding my first dwelling by viewing 
the country. But I found myself mistaken; for being come about two or three miles, I 
found myself descended into a very large valley, but so surrounded with hills, and those
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hills covered with wood, that I could not see which was my way by direction but that of 
the sun, nor even then, unless I knew very well the position of the sun at that time of the 
day.
I could not tell what part of the world this might be, otherwise than that I knew it 
must be part of America, and, as I concluded by my observations, must be near the 
Spanish dominions; and perhaps was all inhabited by savages, where, if  I should have 
landed, I had been in a worse condition than I was now; and therefore I acquiesced in the 
dispositions of Providence, which I began now to own and to believe ordered everything 
for the best; I say I quieted my mind with this, and left afflicting myself with fruitless 
wishes of being there.
Besides, after some pause upon this affair, I considered that if  this land was 
Spanish coast, I should certainly, one time or other, see some vessel pass or repass one 
way or the other; but if  not, then it was the savage coast between the Spanish country 
and Brazil, which are indeed the worst of savages, for they are cannibals, or men-eaters, 
and fail not to murder and devour all the human bodies that fall into their hands.
With these considerations I walked very leisurely forward. I found that side of 
the island where I now was much pleasanter than mine; the open savanna fields sweet, 
adorned with flowers and grass, and full of very fine woods. I saw abundance of parrots, 
and fain I would have caught one, if possible, to have kept it to be tame, and taught it to 
speak to me. I did, after some painstaking, catch a young parrot, for I knocked it down 
with a stick, and having recovered it I brought it home; but it was some years before I 
could make him speak. However, at last I taught him to call me by my name very 
familiarly. But the accident that followed, though it be trifle, will be very diverting in its 
place.
I was exceedingly diverted with this journey. I found in the low grounds hares, as 
I thought them to be and foxes; but they differed greatly from all the other kinds I had 
met with, not could I satisfy myself to eat them, though I killed several. But I had no 
need to be venturous, for I had not want for food, and of that which was very good too; 
especially these three sorts- namely, goats, pigeons, and turtle or tortoise, which, added to
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my grapes, Leadenhall Market could not have furnished a table better than I in proportion 
to the company. And though my case was deplorable enough, yet I had great cause for 
thankfulness, and that I was not driven to any extremities for food, but rather plenty, even 
to dainties.
It happened to my further misfortune, that the weather proved to be hazy for three 
or four days while I was in the valley; and not being able to see the sun, I wandered about 
very uncomfortably, and at last was obliged to find the sea-side, look for my post, and 
come back the same way I went. And then by easy journey I turned homeward, the 
weather being exceedingly hot, and my gun, ammunition, hatchet, and other things very 
heavy.
I reposed myself here a week, to rest and regale myself after my long journey; 
during which most of the dime was taken up in the weighty affair of making a cage for 
my poll, who began now to be a mere domestic, and to be mighty well acquainted with 
me. Then I began to think of the poor kid which I had penned in within my little circle, 
and resolved to go and fetch it home or give it some food.
Accordingly, I went, and found it where I left it; for, indeed, it could not get out, 
but almost starved for want of food. I went and cut boughs of trees and branches of such 
shrubs as I could find, and threw it over; and having fed it, I tied it as I did before, to lead 
it away. But it was so tame with being hungry that I had no need to have tied it, for it 
followed me like a dog; and as I continually fed it, the creature became so loving, so 
gentle, and so fond, that it became from that time one of my domestics also, and would 
never leave me afterwards.
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Appendix E
Subject Number: 
Questionnaire C
Instructions:
Please read each of the following questions carefully and answer the 
questions in the format provided. After finishing the questionnaire please put the 
questionnaire back into the folder and wait for the research assistant to give you 
further instructions.
All answers that you provide in the questionnaire will be kept strictly confidential.
Thank you very much for your assistance!
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1. Please describe the purpose of this study in your own words.
2. What knowledge do you think the experimenter was trying to gain by performing this 
study?
Please fill out the enclosed survey!!!
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Dear Participants,
The Psychology Department takes great pride in developing competent 
and knowledgeable graduate students. The Psychology Department is in the 
process of evaluating its graduate students to ensure that they have the proper 
research skills.
It has come to our attention that the experimenter performing the 
experiment you are currently participating in may be unfairly treating his/her 
participants. Specifically, there is a procedure in the experiment that some 
individuals might find punishing. As part of the evaluation of this researcher and 
his/her experiment, we would invite you to answer the three questions found at 
the bottom of this survey. Your honest responses will provide the Psychology 
Department and this researcher valuable feedback. Please answer honestly the 
following questions based on the experiences you had in this experiment. The 
information you provide us will be kept strictly confidential. The responses you 
provide on this survey will in no way affect your standing at the University of 
Nebraska at Omaha. After completing the survey, please fold the survey and 
place it in the white envelope provided by the experimenter. Finally, seal the 
envelope to ensure anonymity. The experimenter will forward the survey to the 
Psychology Department.
Thank you for your cooperation,
University of Nebraska at Omaha Psychology Department 
Based on your experience with this researcher:
1. I would recommend this research experiment to other students (circle one).
2. If given the opportunity, I would not participate in research by the same 
experimenter (circle one).
SD D
Strongly Disagree
disagree
N
Neutral Agree Strongly 
agree
A SA
SD D
Strongly Disagree
disagree
N
Neutral
A SA
Agree Strongly
agree
3. Overall, I believe the experiment was performed well (circle one).
SD D N
Neutral
A SA
Agree Strongly
agree
Strongly Disagree 
disagree
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Appendix F
Subject Number: 
Task # 1 Scoring Sheet
Number of tickets taken away: none (0) o r ________________
The number of tickets you received for completing this task:
(The account will go here or on a separate sheet of paper)
Remember you can get an additional 10 tickets by performing satisfactorily on Task 
#2.
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Appendix G 
Informed Consent Form
THE EXAMINATION OF INDIVIDUAL’S PERFORMANCE ON SIMPLE 
TASKS.
You are invited to participate in this research study. The information in this consent form 
is provided to help you decide whether to participate. If you have any questions, please 
do not hesitate to ask.
You were selected for participation in this study because you are an English-speaking 
adult.
The purpose of this study is to examine how people perform on simple tasks.
You will be asked to perform two editing tasks that will take 10 minutes each. 
Additionally, you will be asked to complete three short questionnaires. Approximately 
40 minutes of your time will be required.
There are no known risks or discomforts associated with this research.
The information collected by the tasks and questionnaires in this study will be identified 
by number and not by name. There will be no information that could identify you as an 
individual. All responses to the questionnaires will be kept confidential.
You will have the possibility of winning a $150 gift certificate that will be given away 
through a lottery system by participating in the study.
You have rights as a research participant. These rights are explained in The Rights of  
Research Participants which you have been given. If you have any questions concerning 
your rights, you may contact the Institutional Review Board (IRB), telephone (402) 559- 
6463.
You are free to decide not to participate in this study or to withdraw at any time without 
adversely affecting your relationship with the investigators or the University of Nebraska. 
Your decision will not result in any loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.
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DOCUMENTATION OF INFORMED CONSENT
YOU ARE VOLUNTARILY MAKING A DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO 
PARTICIPATE IN THIS RESEARCH STUDY. YOUR SIGNATURE CERTIFIES 
THAT YOU HAVE DECIDED TO PARTICIPATE HAVING READ AND 
UNDERSTOOD THE INFORMATION PRESENTED. YOU WILL BE GIVEN A 
COPY OF THIS CONSENT FORM TO KEEP.
SIGNITURE OF PARTICIPANT DATE
IN MY JUDGMENT THE PARTICIPANT IS VOLUNTARILY AND 
KNOWINGLY GIVING INFORMED CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS 
RESEARCH STUDY.
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR DATE
IDENTIFICATION OF THE INVESTIGATORS 
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR
Andy Noon Off: 554-2591
SECONDARY INVESTIGATOR
Wayne Harrison, Ph.D. Off: 554-2452
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Appendix H
Ideological Account
Unfortunately, you did not circle enough Ts to achieve the 90% accuracy 
criterion necessary to earn all 10 lottery tickets for Task 1. As you can see, you did 
receive some lottery tickets for your efforts. Since you did not receive all 10 tickets, I 
feel that it is important that you know why you received the number o f tickets you did.
A recent research study in the Journal o f Applied Psychology found that the 
removal of a positive incentive can effectively increase individuals’ motivation to 
perform. The tasks that are performed in this study are effort tasks. During effort tasks, 
individuals’ level of motivation has a greater influence on their performance than does 
their level of ability.
I have taken away these tickets hopefully to help motivate you to perform better 
on Task 2. Since you did not reach the performance criterion, it is definitely important 
that you perform well on Task 2 so that you will gain all 10 tickets for that task. You still 
have a great opportunity to gain all 10 lottery tickets for Task 2, so I hope you will be 
motivated to perform your best on Task 2. By gaining all 10 lottery tickets, you will have 
a greater chance of winning the $150 gift certificate.
Causal Account
Unfortunately, you did not circle enough Ts to achieve the 90% accuracy 
criterion necessary to earn all 10 lottery tickets for Task 1. As you can see, you did 
receive some lottery tickets for your efforts. Since you did not receive all 10 tickets, I 
feel that it is important that you know why you received the number o f tickets you did.
My Thesis committee decided that participants who did not perform satisfactorily 
would have some of their tickets taken away to increase their motivation to perform on 
Task 2. The committee felt that the level of punishment you received was most 
appropriate to motivate participants to perform better on Task 2. I was not responsible 
for determining the punishment you received. You will still have an opportunity on Task 
2 to gain 10 tickets to use in the lottery for the $150 gift certificate.
Redundant Account
You did not receive all 10 lottery tickets because you did not perform 
satisfactorily on Task 1.
